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TAXATION DIRECTED AGAINST THE CHAIN STORE
INDEPENDENT merchants have sought for many years to hamper
the development of chain stores and by burdening them with
taxes and regulations to offset the competitive advantage the
latter have acquired through their more efficient methods of re-
tailing and distribution. Resultant legislation of the sort typi-
fied by the police regulation of chain drug stores in Pennsyl-
vaniao and the prohibition of chain systems in Maryland as
monopolies,2 proved too severe to be successful. Accordingly the
anti-chain interests have recently been resorting to taxation as
an alternative impediment. During the past tVo years more
than eighty bills designed to place heavier tax burdens upon
chain systems than upon independent retail merchants have been
introduced into the legislatures of twenty-nine states3 While
only seven such measures have thus far become laws, it is safe
to predict that when the legislatures of forty-four states convene
this coming year, other such statutes will be enacted.4
The License Tax
The so-called "chain store license tax," the first device at-
tempted, was adopted by four states-Georgia,- Indiana," North
Carolina 7 and South Carolina.s The Quaker Maid case " in Ken-
tucky in 1926 was really a forerunner to the litigation that has
arisen over this type of tax. The city of Danville, in a thinly-
veiled effort to discriminate against chain stores, had passed an
ordinance imposing a $12 license tax on each ordinary retail
grocery store but exacting a fee of $50 from stores extending
no credit and providing no delivery. The Supreme Court of Ken-
' Liggett v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105, 49 Sup. Ct. 57 (1928).
2Keystone Grocery Co. v. Huster, (Allegheny County Court, Mld., Equity
Case No. 10922, 1927, unreported).
3 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CHAIN STORE ASSOCIATION (Oct. 1,
1930) 16-22.
4 W. N. Taft, Result of Clmin Baiting (Nov. 1930) CHAIN STORE AGE 30.
5 GA. CODE (Supp. 1930) § 993 (280).
6Ind. Acts 1930, c. 207.
7 N. C. Acts 1927, c. 80, §, 162.
s S. C. Acts 1930, No. 829.
9 City of Danville v. Quaker Maid Co., 211 Ky. 677, 278 S. W. 98 (1926).
Cf. City of Covington v. Dalheim, 126 Ky. 26, 102 S. W. 829 (1907) (tax
on grocers using delivery wagons held invalid because discriminatory).
[4311
YALE LAW JOURNAL
tucky granted an injunction against the collection of this tax on
the ground that there was no sufficient difference between the
two types of stores designated in the ordinance to justify the
classification. In 1928 the first tax case expressly involving
chain stores came up under a North Carolina statute 1I providing
for the collection of a license tax of $50 from each retail store
operated by any person or organization maintaining six or more
stores in the state. This statute was held invalid in Great Atlan-
tic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Doughton 11 on the ground that large
scale methods of buying and selling, seen as the sole distinguish-
ing characteristic of the chain store, did not sufficiently differen-
tiate it from the store of the individual merchant to warrant
separate classification. The following year the same result was
reached by a United States District Court in a well-considered
opinion in the case of Jackson v. Board of Tax Commissioners 1
which involved the license tax in Indiana, 13 graduated from $3
on the first store to $25 on each store, in excess of twenty, oper-
ated by the s'ame concern. North Carolina meanwhile had
changed its statute to impose a tax of $50 on each store, in ex-
cess of one, operated by the same individual or corporation.14
And in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company v. Maxwell,1" the
Supreme Court of that state, by an unexpected reversal of front,
upheld the statute. The Court distinguished its previous deci-
sion in the Dounghton case on the basis that the tax there de-
clared invalid had not been levied on chain stores per se, and
asserted without further explanation that there exists a real and
substantial difference between the operation of chains and inde-
pendent stores. Both this and the Indiana case are now pending
before the Supreme Court of the United States.
There is little doubt that this type of license tax will be con-
demned by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional." According
'to the principle which it has frequently reiterated in considering
license taxes, there must be between the classes created by the
tax statute a "real and substantial difference," bearing "a rea-
sonable relation to the subject of the legislation," in order to
10 Supra note 7.
11196 N. C. 145, 144 S. E. 701 (1928).
22 38 F. (2d) 652 (D. Ind. 1930).
13 See supra note 6.
14 N. C. Acts 1929, c. 345, § 162. The possibilities of this type of statuto
are illustrated by the recent declaration of the Attorney General of North
Carolina that public utility corporations which sell gas and electric ap-
pliances at their places of business are retailers within the scope of this
statute. U. S. Daily, Dec. 15, 1930, at 3142.
15 154 S. E. 838 (N. C. 1930).
26 Cf. Becker and Hess, Chain Store License Tax and the 14th Ancnd-
nent (1929) 7 N. C. L. REV. 113, 120; (1928) Note 77 U. OF PA. L. RBv.




qualify the classification under the "equal protection" clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment." Inasmuch as both chains and in-
dependent merchants carry much the same stock of goods, and
distribute to the public in.much the same manner, it may well be
argued that they differ only in respect to ownership and method
of operation. This difference, it has been asserted, is not suffi-
cient to meet the requirements of a valid classification.'2 More-
over, the Supreme Court has given weight to this contention, as
far as the factor of ownership is concerned, by its decision in
the Quaker City Cab Co. case,"2 where a gross receipts tax was
held invalid because it discriminated against corporate proprie-
tors of taxicabs. The distinction made in that statute, however,
was predicated solely upon the legal personality of the owner as
a corporation or as an individual. -0  Moreover, since a classifica-
tion based strictly on the amount of business transacted may be
deemed reasonable,21 a distinction dependent on form of organi-
zation might be recognized were such form an accurate index
of the volume of trade.2 Fundamental differences in character
of business have also been recognized by the Supreme Court as
a valid ground for classification. Thus wholesale and retail
dealers have frequently been distinguished for this purpose, -3
-17See Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 417, 30 Sup. Ct 287, 291
(1909); Crescent Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U. S. 129, 137, 42 Sup. Ct. 42,
44 (1921); Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 37, 48
Sup. Ct. 423, 425 (1928).
Is Strawn, op. cit. supra note 16, at 28. See also Note (1928) 77 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 426, 427.
19 Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 48 Sup. Ct. 553
(1928).
20 Cf. Note (1928) 28 COL. L. REV. 972; Note (1928) 27 Mlicu. L. 1REV. 800.
21 See Citizens Telephone Co. v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 322, 328, 33 Sup. Ct.
833; 834 (1913).
22 Cf. Note (1928) 27 MICH. L. REV. 800, 802. Where the Supreme Court
has found that there is usually an important difference in the degree of
business transacted by corporations as compared with that done by indi-
viduals, it has upheld such a classification. Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., 220
U. S. 107, 158, 31 Sup. Ct. 343, 353 (1910) (corporate income tax upheld) ;
Amoskeag Savings Bank v. Purdy, 231 U. S. 373, 393, 34 Sup. Ct. 114, 118
(1913) (state tax on national bank stock upheld despite denial of deduc-
tion for debts which was allowed to individual bankers) ; of. Miller v. Wil-
son, 236 U. S. 373, 384, 35 Sup. Ct. 342, 344 (1914) (statute limiting the
hours of work for women in hotel upheld though no such restriction was
placed on boarding houses operated by individuals). In the Quaker
City Cab Co. case, supra note 19, it is not clear to what extent this con-
sideration was involved. The Court said "The discrimination here is not
justified by any difference in the source of the receipts or in the situation
or character of the property employed." 277 U. S. at 402, 48 Sup. Ct. at 555.
But cf. the dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes in the same case. 277 U. S. at
403, 48 Sup. Ct. at 555.
23 Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114, 30 Sup. Ct. 496 (1910);
-American Harrow Co. v. Shaffer, 68 Fed. 750 (D. Va. 1895); Daniels v.
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and a state legislature was recently permitted to treat coopera-
tive marketing associations as a separate class. 4  Similarly, in
at least two instances, the Supreme Court has upheld for tax
purposes a classification based upon th*e difference between two
methods of carrying on the same business. 25  It is hence to be
expected that arguments for the validity of chain store license
taxes will stress not only an essential variance in amount of busi-
ness transacted but also a characteristically unique quality in
the business itself.
The peculiar weakness of the license tax device, as it has thus
far been employed, lies in the obviousness of its intention to dis-
criminate against chain stores.26 It was because their arbitrary
purpose was similarly apparent that the somewhat analogous
taxes levied against department stores over three decades ago
were held invalid.27 In this connection, the question of the extent
to which a state will be permitted to carry out an avowedly do-
mestic policy by means of taxation arises as a consideration
affecting the validity of the tax. In the Doughton case the court
emphasized the fact that no question of state policy with refer-
State, 150 Ind. 348, 50 N. E. '4 (1898) ; Kniseley v. Cotteral, 196 Pa. 614,
46 AtI. 861 (1900) ; Mefford v. City Council, 148 Ala. 539, 41 So. 970 (1906).
24 Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers Co-op. Marketing
Ass'n, 276 U. S. 71, 48 Sup. Ct. 291 (1928).
2 Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59, 32 Sup. Ct. 192 (1912) (stat-
ute imposing license tax on hand laundries while exempting steam laundries
held not to deny equal protection); Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell,
233 U. S. 304, 34 Sup. Ct. 493 (1914) (tax on business of selling and deliv-
ering sewing machines held not to constitute an unlawful discrimination
when merchants selling machines at their regular place of business ex-
empt). Cf. also Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 30 Sup.
Ct. 578 (1909) (tax imposed on resident rectifiers of liquor held not un-
reasonable because not exacted from non-resident rectifiers); Fort Smith
Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, 251 U. S. 532, 40 Sup. Ct. 304 (1919) (statute
upheld which taxed corporations for stock owned in other corporations
while exempting unincorporated stockholders); Heisler v. Thomas-Colliery
Co., 260 U. S. 245, 43 Sup. Ct. 83 (1922) (tax on anthracite coal upheld
though not levied on bituminous coal).
Classifications have also been upheld when based on the size or popula-
tion of different localities, merchants in different places paying different
amounts. Adam Motor Car Co. v. Cler, 149 Ga. 818, 102 S. E. 440 (1920)
(motor car dealers); Dallas Gas Co. v. State, 261 S. W. 1063 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1924) (public utility corporations). In Tennessee the proposed sales
tax on grocery stores was graduated according to the population of the
county where a store was located. See ANNUAL REPORT OF TUE NATIONAL
CHAIN STORE: ASsoC ATIoN (Oct. 1, 1930) 20.
26 See Heisler v. Thomas Colliery, supra note 25, at '255, 43 Sup. Ct. at
84; Bell's Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 237, 10 Sup. Ct. 533, 535
(1889); Power Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490, 493, 47 Sup Ct. 678, 679
(1926).
27 State v. Ashbrook, 154 Mo. 375, 55 S. W. 627 (1900). Of. City of Chi-
cago v. Netcher, 183 IlM. 104, 55 N. E. 707 (1899) (police regulation aimed
at department stores held unduly discriminatory).
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ence to chain stores was brought up at the trial. 1 In the Jack-
son case considerable stress was laid on this aspect of the case
by both counsel, and the court found that while chain store oper-
ators often do not have the general interest of the community at
heart and hence are not always as valuable to it as stores owned
by single proprietors, this condition was not sufficiently univer-
sal to sustain their different classification for occupational tax
purposes. 9 Yet in the Maxvefl case the North Carolina court
came to quite the opposite conclusion.! The United States Su-
preme Court formerly took the position that a state taxation pol-
icy will warrant a particular classification giving effect to that
policy.31 Accordingly the Court sustained taxes imposed on
occupations which the state in question regarded with disfavor. -
Recently, some doubt has been east on this proposition by the
decision of the Court in Liggett v. Baldridge, 1 which, although
not involving a revenue measure, held invalid an act purporting
to be a police regulation but obviously intended to prevent the
further extension of chain drug stores. It is significant, further-
more, that whereas this attitude of non-interference with state
policies once found expression in the majority opinions of the
Court,-4 it is now stated in the dissents. 5 It may consequently
be doubted whether a presentation of the policy argument before
2 Supra note 11, at 152, 144 S. E. at 705.
29 Supra note 12, at 658.
30 Supra note 15, at 843. But cf: "It is not shown that the interest of
the public, as distinguished from a particular class, requires chain stores
to be regulated .... the evidence does not show that the public have been
damaged by chain stores or their methods of operation." Keystone Gro-
cery & Tea Co. v. Huster, supra note 2 (statute prohibiting any one in-
dividual or firm to operate more than five stores in the county was held
invalid).
31 Cf. Note (1928) 27 MICH. L. REv. 800, 802.
32"A state does not deny the equal protection of the laws merely by
adjusting its revenue laws and taxing system in such a way as to favor
certain industries or forms of industry." Holmes, J., in Quong Wing v.
Kirkendall, supra note 25, at 62, 32 Sup. Ct. at 193. Cf. American Sugar
Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 95, 21 Sup. Ct. 43, 46 (1900), where
the Supreme Court upheld a tax on manufacturers engaged in refining,
which exempted farmers who refined on plantations, for the reason that the
discrimination was obviously intended as an encouragement to agriculture.
33 Supra note 1.
34 The most persistent advocate of non-interference has been Mr. Justice
Holmes. See Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, supra note 25, at 62, 32 Sup. Ct.
at 193; Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 160, 33 Sup.
Ct. 66, 67 (1912).
3z "I did not suppose it to have been denied that taxing acts like other
rules of law may be determined by differences of degree and that to some
extent states may have a domestic policy that they constitutionally may
enforce." Holmes, J., dissenting in the Quaker City Cab Co. case, supra
note 19, at 403, 48 Sup. Ct. at 555. See also Louisville Gas & Electric Co.
v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 41, 48 Sup. Ct. 423, 426 (1928).
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the Court in support of the license tax would prove in any degree
efficacious.30
The argument might conceivably be advanced that license tax
statutes discriminating against chain systems are designed to
protect competition and to prevent monopolies. 7  The wording of
the Georgia statute 31 gives some force to this contention, and
the Supreme Court has on several occasions used language which
justifies the assumption that such an argument might prove
effective.39  The Mississippi court, in a recent case,40 adopted
precisely this reasoning when it upheld a statute regulating
prices to be charged by chain operators of cotton gins on the
ground that the statutory purpose to prevent unfair competition
justified the classification. Moreover judicial recognition has
been accorded the fact that the growth of chain systems has re-
sulted locally in monopolistic practices and the lessening of com-
petition.41 But even granting the existence of such conditions,
it may be doubted whether a relation could be shown between
36 The change in personnel of the Court since the Liggett decision must,
however, be recognized as a factor to be considered, since only four of the
present members of the Court voted with the majority in the Liggett case.
That Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, in his previous term on the Court, con-
curred in the then majority opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes on the point,
may possibly be considered evidence that he will now line up with Justices
Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone, who dissented from the Liggett decision, In
support of non-interference with state taxation policies. On the other hand,
Mr. Justice Roberts may be in sympathy with the views he advanced as
counsel for the Liggett Company, and also for the Quaker City Cab Com-
pany in its analogous protest against a Pennsylvania statute.
'I See Becker and Hess, op. cit. supra note 16, at 128.
38 "Under the police powers of this state, the business of conducting chain
stores . . .hereby is classified as a business tending to foster monopolies
and there is hereby levied on each person, firm, or corporation owing, op-
erating, maintaining, or controlling a chain of stores consisting of more
than five stores, the sum of $50 for each store .... 1" GA. CODa (Supp. 1930)
§ 993 (280).
39 ". . . the law assailed was enacted by the State in the exercise of its
police power, to prevent a practice conceived to be promotive of monopoly
with its attendant evils. It is clearly settled that any classification adopted
by a State in the exercise of this power which has a reasonable basis, and
is therefore not arbitrary, will be sustained against an attack based upon
the equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment .... 
Clarke, J., in Crescent Oil Co. v. Mississippi, supra note 17, at 137, 42 Sup.
Ct. at 44 (cotton seed oil manufacturers not allowed to own or operate
cotton gins). See State v. Central Lumber Co., 226 U. S. 157, 161, 33 Sup.
Ct. 66, 67 (1912) (lumber dealers selling at more than one place required
to set one price).
4 State v. Gilmer Grocery Co., 125 So. 710 (Miss. 1930).
41 See United States v. Southern California Wholesale Grocer's Ass'n, 7
F. (2d) 944, 948 (D. Cal. 1925).
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them and the possible effect of a state-wide license tax, sufficient
to justify the discriminatory character of the tax. Only once
has a court passed upon the validity of the monopoly theory as
a basis for state regulation of chain stores, and there the statute
was held unconstitutional. -
The Sales Tacw
In 1929 the state of Georgia adopted a gross sales tax on all
commodities, to be computed as a flat percentage of gross receipts
after an exemption of $30,000. 3 The anti-chain nature of this
legislation becomes apparent from the fact that a chain of stores
is deemed one business so that but one exemption is permitted
for the entire chain. Even more obviously discriminatory is
the sales tax recently enacted in Mississippi," whereby all per-
sons or companies operating more than five stores in the state
are compelled to pay double rates on their gross sales. In Ken-
tucky the persistency of the anti-chain sentiment was empha-
sized by the shift in legislative program immediately after the
decision in the Jaekson case 4 had warned against obvious efforts
to discriminate against chain stores. Abandoning its proposed
flat percentage tax on sales over an exempted minimum, the Ken-
tucky legislature adopted instead a sales tax imposing a sliding
scale of levies in direct ratio to the volume of annual sales,4" thus
substituting for one method of burdening the chain store another
even more effective if less apparent. Cases involving the con-
stitutionality of each of these three statutes are now pending.
As sales taxes have not been numerous in this country there
are few cases involving their validity.Y- That a state may tax
merchants on the basis of their sales has, however, never been
questioned;" indeed courts are inclined to favor such a tax as
2Keystone Grocery & Tea Co. v. Huster, supra note 2: '. .. and even
if the welfare of the public demanded some form of regulation, this act
wholly fails to provide any regulation at all." The statute made it unlaw-
ful for anyone to own or operate more than five mercantile stores in one
county.
43 GA. CoDE (Supp. 1930) § 993 (323). Georgia now has a license tax
and a gross sales tax, both of which discriminate against chain stores.
"MAIiss. Stat. 1930, No. 567, c. 9, art. 1, § 2.
45 Supra, note 12.
46 Ky. STAT. (1930) § 4202a 1-12.
47Isaacs, Business and Property Taxes (1926) 36 YUE L. J. 195. See
4 CooLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 1673. For a discussion of the prob-
lem raised by the "original package" doctrine in connection with a sales
tax on wholesale gasoline dealers, see Sonneborn v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506,
43 Sup. Ct. 643 (1923).
4s Schuster v. City of Louisville, 124 Ky. 189, 89 S. W. 689 (1903); In
re Opinion of the Justices, 149 Atl. 321, 330 (N. H. 1930) ; CooLEY, op. cit.
supra; note 47, at § 1706.
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based on the amount of business transacted.4  Furthermore a
state is privileged to single out any one commodity or class of
commodities as the object of taxation because the ad valorem and
uniformity clauses of state constitutions do not apply to excise
taxes., At present five states impose small taxes on the gross
sales of all retail mercantile establishments 51 and a proposal for
a similar tax has recently received judicial approval in a sixth
state.5 2 But none of these taxes, all of which operate on a flat
rate and without exemptions, is in any sense discriminatory. In
a few other instances, taxes of a more local character, imposed
on the sales of all kinds of goods, wares and merchandise have
been before the courts." Yet in spite of the fact that some of
these taxes were graduated according to volume of sales, the dis-
crimination issue has never been seriously considered.4
Certain familiar types of sales tax on specific commodities
have recently proven successful. The most important of these,
the gasoline sales tax, was first adopted in 1919 in Colorado,.
Oregon and South Dakota, and has now been imposed in prac.
tically every state. 5  This tax has been levied in various forms,
all of which have been held constitutional,"0 and it has come to,
be an important factor in producing state revenue." Sales or
49 See Hager v. Walker, 128 Ky. 1, 18, 107 S. W. 254, 259 (1908); San
Luis Obispo County v. Greenberg, 120 Cal. 300, 304, 52 Pac. 797, 798 (1898) ;
Comment (1924), 33 YiALE L. J. 321p CooL, op. cit. supra note 47, at
§ 354.
50 Adams Motor Car Co. v. Cler, supra note 25; Gafill v. Bracken, 195 Ind.
551, 145 N. E. 312 (1924); CooLEr, op. cit. supra note 47, at §§ 269, 348.
51 CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) c. 75, §§ 1340-1351; DEL. REV. CODE (1916)
§ 198; W. VA. CODE ANN. (Baries, 1923) c. 31A; PA. STAT. (West, 1920)
§ 14727; Mo. REv. STAT. (1919) § 13065ff.
52 In re Opinion of the Justices, supra note 48.
53 Joseph v. Milledgeville, 97 Ga. 513, 25 S. E. 323 (1895) ; Wayne Mer-
cantile Co. v. Comm'rs, 161 N. C. 121, 76 S. E. 690 (1912); San Luis
Obispo County v. Greenberg, supra note 49.
54 Cf. Clark v. Titusville, 184 U. S. 329, 22 Sup. Ct. 382 (1902). In one
instance the issue was even raised as an ingenious objection to a non-grad-
uated tax. See Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 608, 618, 22 Sup. Ct. 493, 497
(1902).
55 Wham, The Gasoline Tax (1927) 21 ILL. L. REV. 771; (1926) 1 IND. L.
J. 53.
56 Altitude Oil Co. v. People, 70 Colo. 452, 202 Pac. 180 (1920) (flat rate);
Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642, 41 Sup. Ct. 606 (1921),
(flat rate); Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U. S. 466, 42 Sup. Ct. 375 (1922)
(graduated rate); Pierce Oil v. Hopkins, 264 U. S. 137, 44 Sup. Ct. 251
(1924) (flat rate); Gafill v. Bracken, supra note 50 (flat rate); of. Ohio
Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S. 146, 50 Sup. Ct. 311 (1930) (graduated'
severance tax).
57 "Last year the gasoline sales tax collected in the United Statep was
in excess of $431,000,000-a pretty good collection from a standing start
precisely ten years before." W. N. Taft, op. cit. supra note 4, at 3.
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"stamp" taxes on distilled liquors,4s tobacco," and theatre
tickets 60 are also quite common. Yet that the termn "sales tax"
has been indiscriminately applied to assessments measured by
a proportion of gross income and to taxes upon the unit sale of
a specific article in no sense authorizes a common grouping, for
the purpose of determining constitutionality, of two taxes so
dissimilar in manner of incidence. Designed to be shifted di-
rectly to the consumer rather than borne by the business itself,
taxes on unit sales are usually justified as amounting in effect
to taxes on the consumption of the article taxed, with the dealer
serving merely as a collecting agency.,, Thus the gasoline tax,
as it exists in most of the states, while ostensibly a sales tax,
is in fact a charge paid by the consumer for the use of the
roads.62
The chief objection to a sales tax on the general run of com-
modities is that it can not be so easily shifted as can a tax on a
specific commodity.6 3 This criticism applies with especial force
to the type of gross sales tax which is so imposed that the chain
stores bear the major part of its burden. Because of the across-
the-street competition between chains and independent mer-
chants, the former can ill afford to add the tax to the sales price
of the article.6 But the competitive disadvantage created by
such a tax may be balanced by the very economies attendant upon
large-scale operation which the taxes are intended to neutralize.
Furthermore, a nation-wide chain of stores, by distributing
throughout its entire sales territory the burden imposed by a
state tax would be able to maintain its advantageous position in
the taxing state at the expense of consumers elsewhere. Con-
siderations of this sort, however, will probably find little ex-
pression in the opinions of courts confronted with the issue of
statutory validity,61 and it is difficult to see upon what technical
grounds a graduated sales tax such as that imposed by the Ken-
tucky statute can be held invalid.
The problems raised by the intentionally discriminatory char-
acter of chain store taxes are further complicated by the recent
s State Tax Comm'n v. Hughes, 219 Ky. 432, 293 S. W. 944 (1927).
59 Patton v. Brady, op. cit. =upra note 54; Exchange Drug Co. v. Long,
281 U. S. 693, 50 Sup. Ct. 244 (1930) (cigarettes).
co Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 33 Sup. Ct 441 (1913).
- See Pierce Oil Co. v. Hopkins, supr& note 56, at 139, 44 Sup. Ct. at 251;
Wham, op. cit. supra note 55; (1922) 22 MicH. L. REv. 618.
62 Cf. Haig, Bushws Taxati (Nov. 1930) CHAiN STORE AGE 34, 35.
63 See Lionel's Cigar Store v. McFarland, 162 La. 956, 968, 111 So. 341,
347 (1927).
64 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CHAIN STORE ASSOCLIATION (Oct. 1,
1930) 23; cf. Taft, op. cit. supre note 4, at 29.




trend to business taxation. A general conviction" that realty
has been made to bear a disproportionately heavy tax burden in
the past has caused many states to turn to business taxation as
an alternative source of revenue.0 While a few states 08 prefer
the net income tax, as resting directly on the business rather
than on the consuming public, the sales tax is the more obvious
solution.6 9 Hence in considering the motives behind this form
of taxation, it will be hard for the courts to distinguish hostility
towards the chain store from a genuine need of state funds.
The current situation, in respect to the taxing of chain stores,
is a lesson in the use of devices. It demonstrates vividly how
the identical legislative purpose which has been judicially de-
feated when attempted in one manner may be attained by a
strategic shift of contrivance. In its effect on the chain stores,
the sales tax is as damaging and discriminatory as any of the
license taxes which the courts have labelled unconstitutional. In
fact, the condemnation of the earlier device forces recourse to
imposition on the chains of a potentially far greater burden."
The courts profess to regard primarily the practical operation
of a tax, and to deal with it according to its effect.71 Yet where a
tax statute classifies without assuming to classify in the consti-
tutional sense, inequalities of result have been said to grow out
of inequalities of business conditions, which in turp have been
said to be beyond control by law.72 Whether those concerns
whose extensive field of operation enables them to cut prices to
correspond with a lower unit cost should be handicapped in or-
der to protect the competing local yeomanry of the trade is a
question dependent for its solution upon debatable issues of pol-
icy. At least it may be predicted, that, although a few legisla-
66 Cf. Haig, op. cit. supra note 62, at 35. For accounts of the recent
agitation in New York State over the need of some relief from taxation
on real estate, see New York Times, Nov. 18, 19, 20, 1930.
67 Taft, op. cit. supra note 4, at .30.
s California, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Washington and Wis-
consin have enacted net income taxes. See Haig, op. cit. supra note 62,
at 34.
6 In addition to the states which have adapted a sales tax, it has been
proposed in Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington
and West Virginia. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CHAIN STOIW
AssoCIATION (Oct. 1, 1930) 16-22.
70 Georgia, for instance, has already considered adding to the tax rate
and it will probably be increased periodically. See Taft, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 29.
71 See Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 494, 45 Sup. Ct. 603, 604
(1924); Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218, 222, 48 Sup. Ct.
451, 453 (1927).




tures, encouraged by the Maxzvell decision in North Carolina,
will proceed to. enact license taxes, the future history of anti-
chain store agitation, should it survive, will be written in terms
of the sales tax on merchandise.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
AS LIMITED BY DOCTRINAL IMMUNITY OF FED-
ERAL JURISDICTION TO IODIFICATION BY STATE
STATUTE
SINCE at least 18381 there has existed the venerable doctrine
that the jurisdiction of a federal court can neither be re-
stricted nor enlarged by the statutes of a state. In the recent
case of McNeal-Edvards Co. v. Frank L. Young Co.2 this prin-
ciple once again comes to light. In that case a Virginia corpora-
tion, which had done no business in Massachusetts, brought suit
against a Massachusetts corporation in the Federal District
Court of Massachusetts for the conversion of drums used in ship-
ping oil ordered by the Massachusetts company. The latter then
brought suit for breach of warranty in the same court against
the Virginia corporation and served process under a Massachu-
setts statute 3 providing that:
"If an action is brought by a person not an inhabitant of the
commonwealth or who cannot be found herein to be served with
prOCess, he shall be held to answer to any action brought against
here by the -defendant in the former action, if the demands
are of such a nature that the judgment or execution in the one
case may be set off against the judgment or execution in the
other. ... The writ in such cross action may be served on the
attorney of record for the plaintiff in the original action, and
such service shall be as valid and effectual as if made on the
party himself in the commonwealth."
Relying on the above oft-repeated formula, the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit (Judge Anderson dissenting) held
that the statute was inapplicable to suits brought in a Federal
court, notwithstanding the Conformity Act,4 and directed that
the case be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Court said:
I See Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300, 328 (U. S. 1838).
242 F. (2d) 362 (C. C. A. 1st, 1930).
3 AIlAss. GEN. LAW (1921) c. 227, §§ 2, 3.
4 "The practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in civil
causes, other than equity and admiralty causes, in the district courts, shall
conform, as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes
of proceeding existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of
the State within which such district courts are held, any rule of court to
the contrary notwithstanding." 17 STAT. 197 (1872), 28 U. S. C. § 724
(1926). For criticism of the Conformity Act as unsatisfactory, see, DOBIE,
FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1927) 585; Comment (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 853.
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"It is well settled that a question of this character [the acqui-
sition of jurisdiction over a defendant by the service of process]
involves the jurisdiction of the court as a federal court, which
jurisdiction cannot be enlarged or abridged by any statute of a
state or the decisions of its courts." 5
The cases which have held that a state statute can neither re-
strict nor enlarge the jurisdiction of a federal court, may be
divided into three categories. First, there are those cases in
which it is held that where Congress has prescribed a rule for
the federal courts to follow, such a rule is to be given precedence
over state legislation on the same matter.6 But since in the in-
stant case no federal legislation covers the field with which the,
Massachusetts statute is concerned, and since the case was prop-
erly cognizable by the federal court by virtue of diversity of
citizenship 7 and by the fact that suit was brought in a district
prescribed by the Judicial Code," there would seem to be no such
conflict between state and federal legislation as would render the
cases in the first category controlling. Those cases comprising
the second category, where it is held that the privilege of resort-
ing to the federal courts cannot be removed by state statute, are
similarly inapplicable to the situation presented by the instant
5 42 F. (2d) at 367. The court said further: "The statute of Massa-
chuetts (chapter 227, §§ 2-4), if upheld and enforced in the federal court
for the district of Massachusetts, would contravene the acts of Congress
in two important particulars: First, it would abridge the right given a
nonresident to sue in that court by making the exercise of the right con-
ditional upon its waiving personal service of process upon it, in case any
citizen or citizens of Massachusetts, made defendants in its suit, should
conclude to bring independent actions against it. And, second, it would
enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal court in the district of Massachusetts,
as to suits brought against the nonresident by doing away with the re-
quirement of personal service of process and substituting in its place ther
constructive service provided for in the state statute. For these reasons
we think the statute of Massachusetts cannot be upheld and enforced in
the District Court for Massachusetts, whether its enforcement would or
would not contravene the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which the Supreme Court in Riverside Mills v. Menefee, supra, its latest
decision on the question, held that it would." Ibid. 371.
6Belonging to this class are the following four cases, cited by the present
court, in which the conflict concerned a congressional provision for appeal
from the lower federal courts to the Supreme Court on a question of juris-
diction. Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202, 13 Sup. Ct. 44
(1892); Mexican Central R. R. v. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 194, 13 Sup. Ct. 859
(1893); Davidson Marble Co. v. Gibson, 213 U. S. 10, 29 Sup. Ct. 324
(1909); Mechanical Appliance Co. v. Castelman, 215 U. S. 437, 30 Sup.
Ct. 125 (1910). See 25 STAT. 693 (1889) and 26 STAT. 826 (1891).
718 STAT. 137 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 41 (1926).
s Where the federal jurisdiction is founded on diversity of citizenship,
"suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the
plaintiff or defendant." 18 STAT. 137 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 112 (1926).
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-decision.9 And the cases making up the third category, where
a federal court has refused to apply a state statute on the ground
that the statute violated the due process clause,", are likewise
hardly decisive of the present case once it is assumed, as the
,court does in the instant case, that it is unnecessary to decide
whether the statute violates this clause.- Thus it would appear
that none of the decisions setting out the general doctrine that
state law cannot modify federal jurisdiction stand as direct au-
thority for the present decision.12
On the other hand, although little direct authority has been
found to the effect that the particular Massachusetts statute
under discussion permits a counter suit against a foreign corpo-
ration in a federal court under the facts of the principal case,'0
nevertheless, such a result might well be supported by numer-
ous federal cases in which state statutes have had the effect of
modifying the scope of federal court activity despite the ancient
formula upon which the instant court relied. In Amy v. Water-
town,14 the Supreme Court of the United States held that a serv-
ice normally valid in a federal court was invalid because of a
state statute. There, as in the present situation, the case was
-properly cognizable by the particular federal court because of
diversity of citizenship and the fact that suit was brought in
the proper district as provided by the judicial code. Yet there
was a dismissal of the suit in the Watertown case because of a
9 Chicago & N. W. Ry v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270 (U. S. 1871); Southern
Pacifie Co. v. Denton, supra note 6; Barrow Steamship v. Kane, 170 U. S.
100, 18 Sup. Ct. 526 (1898) ; See DoBI, op. cit. supra. note 4, at 337 ct scq.
31 Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518, 15 Sup. Ct. 559 (1895). That
the Supreme Court considers the Goldey ease to have been decided on
due process grounds, see Riverside MIills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189, 35 Sup.
Ct. 579 (1914). Nevertheless, the instant court relied strongly on the
general language of the Goldey case to sustain its decision.
" See supra note 5.
12Federal equity cases, having been specifically excluded from the Con-
formity Act, are not relevant to the present discussion. Colman v. Ameri-
can Warp Drawing Mach. Co., 235 Fed. 531 (D. Mlass. 1915).
13 Two cases in the Federal District Court of Massachusetts have held
that the statute under consideration applies to suits originated in those
courts. Arkwright Mills v. Aultman Co., 128 Fed. 195 (C. C. D. Blass.
1904), held that the Massachusetts statute applied as an extension of the
law of set-off, and Huntington Mfg. Co. v. Bradford Worsted Co., 37 F.
(2d) 730 (D. Mass. 1915), held that the statute applies even where the
attorney on whom service was made was employed by an assignee of the
non-residents claim. Two further federal cases recognized, without discus-
sion, the applicability of the statute. Colman v. American Warp Drawing
Mach. Co., -upra note 12; Sherburne Co. v. Willenstein Kraus & Co., 285
Fed. 793, 794 (D. lass. 1923).
14130 U. S. 301, 9 Sup. Ct. 530 (1889). The state mode of service on
foreign corporations is followed in federal courts. McCord Lumber Co. Y.
Doyle, 97 Fed. 22 (C. C. A. 8th, 1899), certiorari denied, 176 U. S. 682, 20
Sup. Ct. 1025 (1900). For a collection of cases see, 14 Rose's NorEs 714.
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state statute, while in the instant decision it was dismissed in
spite of such a statute. Persuasive general authority for reach-
ing a result contrary to that of the instant court is likewise to
be found in cases which hold valid a service of process in a fed-
eral court, made pursuant to a state statute, upon one designated
by the statute as the corporate process agent but who is not
otherwise an agent of the corporation served. 15 Such a contrary
result might also be supported by decisions in which it has been
held that state statutes providing for set-offs or counterclaims
in actions at law may be invoked as the basis for a similar pro-
ceeding in a federal court.1 And without multiplying examples
unduly, this conclusion might be further justified by the numer-
out instances where a new right created by state law is held en-
forceable in a federal court with the result that the total number
of causes triable in a federal court is enlarged by state acts.1"
Yet before considering whether this particular statute should
have been held to allow a counter suit in a federal court in Mass-
achusetts, it seems advisable to determine whether the statute
would contravene the constitutional guarantee of due process
were the counter suit brought in the prescribed manner in a
Massachusetts state tribunal. Clearly if there exists a constitu-
tional bar to prevent even a state court from obtaining jurisdic-
tion in the manner permitted by the statute, then the effect of
this statute upon the jurisdiction of a federal court becomes aca-
demic. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in Aldrich v. Blatchford & Co.,"8 had little or no
doubt of the constitutionality of this same statute. Whatever con-
stitutional objections to this particular type of statute do exist,
appear to center about the question of due process; and the due
process issue in turn seems to hinge upon whether the statute
makes reasonable provision for assuring a defendant of notice
15 Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147, 23 Sup. Ct.
707 (1903); American Railway Express Co. v. Royster Guano Co., 273 U.
S. 274, 47 Sup. Ct. 355 (1925). See Cahill, Jurisdiction over Foreign Cor-
porations (1917) 30 HARv. L. R-v. 676, 691.
'
6 Datson v. Kirk, 180 Fed. 14 (C. C. A. 4th, 1910); Woodlawn Farm
Dairy Co. v. Erie R.R., 282 Fed. 278 (D. Pa. 1921); cf. S. M. Hess & Bro.
v. Small, 288 Fed. 995 (E. D. N. Y. 1923) (N. Y. statute providing for
summary judgment held applicable to federal court). See Dunshano v.
Benedict, 120 U. S. 630, 636, 7 Sup. Ct. 696, 699 (1887). For a collection
of cases, see 28 U. S. C. A. (1927) § 724 n. 226.
17 See DoBan, op. cit. supra note 4, at 337. For an extensive collection
of cases, see 28 U. S. C. A. (1927) § 725. Moreover federal courts will not
permit the state creating the right to restrict the forum for the remedy.
Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Whitton, supra note 9. No attempt is made herein
to discuss the nebulous distinction between increasing the number of causes,
and "enlarging the jurisdiction." Such distinctions usually result in mean-
ingless obscurity.
1s 175 Mass. 369, 56 N. E. 700 (1900).
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of suit and upon whether the court in which suit is brought has
jurisdiction in the sense of power over the defendant.
With respect to the notice requirement, it is generally held that
where the statutory process agent is not otherwise an agent of
the defendant, it is necessary that the statute objectively show
that notice is required to be received by the defendant.", But
where the person to be served is otherwise an agent of the de-
fendant, it is only necessary that he be an agent of sufficient
responsibility to warrant assumption that his principal will re-
ceive notice. ° In view of the confidential relation between at-
torney and client it would seem that the statute under consider-
ation satisfies this requirement of notice.2 1
The traditional starting point in the determination of whether
a court has jurisdiction in the sense of power over the defendant
is the famous doctrine of Penawyer v. Neff 22 that "process from
the tribunals of one state cannot run into another state, and sum-
mon parties there domiciled to leave its territory, and respond to
proceedings against them." 23 But even if foreign corporations
to which the instant statute is applicable be regarded as parties
domiciled elsewhere than in Massachusetts, it is scarcely neces-
sary to point out that the concept of process has advanced far
beyond the requirement that the physical presence of the defend-
ant is necessary to a valid judgment. 4  The cases sustaining
statutes providing for jurisdiction over foreign corporations do-
ing business within the state 25 and over non-resident motorists O
have so expanded the doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff that, what-
ever the explanation offered, the fact remains that the process of
one state can reach out and summon a defendant domiciled else-
where.
19"Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 Sup. Ct. 259 (1928).
20 If the Massachusetts statute had designated a public official as process
agent and had required that notice be given to the defendant, the statute
would clearly be valid insofar as notice is concerned. Hess v. Pawlosbi,
274 U. S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632 (1927).
21 It would appear immaterial that an attorney's implied powers as agent
of his client do not include acceptance of original service of process. If
such were the case there would be no need for the statute malting the bring-
ing of suit an appointment of the attorney as process agent. See, 2
MIECHEm, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) 1743.
22 95 U. S. 714 (1877).
23Ibid. 727.
24 Cf. Dodd, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions (1929) 23 ILL. L. REV. 427.
'-See CONFLCT OF LAWS RESTATEmNT (Am. L. Inst. 1930) § 98; HEx-
DERSON, POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1918) c. V.; SCOTT, FUNDAMAENTALs OF PROCEDmuE (1922) c. II; Dodd,
op. cit. spra note 24; Cahill, op. cit. supra, note 15; Bullington, Jurisdic-
tion Over Foreign Corporations (1926) 24 Mlici. L. Rxv. 633; Note (1929)
42 HARv. L. Rnv. 1063.
26 Cf. Hess v. Palowski, supra, note 20; Scott, Jurisdiction of Non-resident
Motorists (1926) 39 HARv. L. REv. 563.
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Fully as rational a basis for jurisdiction can be worked out
for the instant statute as in the case of a non-resident motorist
or a foreign corporation doing business within te state .2  The
recent case of Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford
R. R.28 has upheld the right of New York to deny its courts to
a non-resident suing a non-resident and older notions of the ex-
tent to which courts may go in this direction are undergoing lib-
eral revision. 0  Moreover, the acquisition of jurisdiction in the
sense of power by virtue of a non-resident's use of the courts
of a state seems as reasonable as the admittedly valid acquisition
of jurisdictional power by virtue of a non-resident's use of high-
ways or business opportunities of a state. And if a state can
impose jurisdictional conditions upon both interstate corpora-
tions 30 doing business within its borders and non-resident motor-
ists 3 using its highways, despite the fact that neither can be
entirely excluded, the mere fact that a state cannot completely "
deny foreign corporations the use of its courts would hardly
seem to render a state powerless to condition such use. Further-
more, in view of the admitted constitutionality of state legis-
lation subjecting a plaintiff to a state court's jurisdiction for
purposes of set-off and counterclaim, it is but a slight step to
hold constitutional a statute merely making service of writ on
the plaintiff's attorney a condition of the cross judgment."
Assuming, therefore, that the statute in question is constitu-
tional insofar as a cross suit commenced in a Massachusetts state
court is concerned, the problem remains whether the statute
should have been classed with those which have served to modify
27 None of the conventional theories offered to explain the basis of juris-
diction over foreign corporations appears to offer a satisfactory rationale.
See GOODRICH, CoNFIcT OF LAws (1927) 140-151.
28 279 U. S. 377, 49 Sup. Ct. 25 (1929); see Comment (1930) 39 YALE
L. J. 388; Note (1930) 18 CALIF. L. REv. 159.
29 Cf. Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions (1930) 43 HAS'v. L. RoV.
1217.
30 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 34 Sup. Ct.
944 (1914).
31Supra note 26.
32 International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 30 Sup. Ct. 481
(1910); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 42 Sup.
Ct. 106 (1921).
33 The statement of the Circuit Court in the instant case that a set off
"is a plea or defense filed in the action in which it is pleaded, and not an
independent suit" is not convincing, for without a state statute permitting
a set-off or counterclaim to be pleaded in the principal action, the defend-
ant's claim would be enforceable only in an independent suit requiring
service of original process as in the principal case. And the effect of the
set-off or counterclaim statute is to enable the federal court to adjudicate
the claim without a service of process which might have been impossible
under the particular circumstances. The Massachusetts statute does little
more than this. Cf. Aldrich v. Blatchford & Co., supra note 18.
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the jurisdiction of a federal court despite the doctrine that state
acts cannot modify that jurisdiction. Since the statute does not
attempt to create new grounds for invoking the jurisdiction of
a federal court but merely applies where a basis for federal juris-
diction already exists by reason of diversity of citizenship,-" and
since the venue provision of the Judicial Code is satisfied where
suit is brought in the district of the residence of either the plain-
tiff or defendant, 35 it would seem that the statute closely resem-
bles those state laws which have served to modify federal juris-
diction by directing how process may be served20 In this re-
spect the statute seems most clearly analogous to the statutes
providing for service of process on foreign corporations and on
non-resident motorists. In the case of the foreign corporation
statutes a federal court admittedly has original jurisdiction and,
while there is as yet no decision on the same question with refer-
ence to a non-resident motorist, it seems undeniable that federal
courts would entertain original suits brought pursuant to the
state statutes.
The failure of the instant court to advert to the most closely
analogous statutes and its reliance upon a vague formula applied
in entirely dissimilar cases seems to result in a very unsatisfac-
tory decision. The denial of jurisdiction is certainly antithetical
to the increasingly popular tendency to settle all phases of the
litigation in one suit. From the point of view of expediency, the
economy of judicial machinery, and the time of all concerned,
it is highly desirable that one court and one jury should hear
every claim arising out of one transaction' And although such
a policy raises the danger of vexatious suits which might have
the result of forcing the non-resident to import a large number
of witnesses for no legitimate purpose, this consideration loses
all force if both the non-resident's suit and the resident's counter
suit involve the same witnesses. Probably this cannot well be
ascertained before trial and a "same witness rule" would not be
workable in itself, but given a device which will permit the court
34 Supra note 7.
35 Supra note 8.
6 It is fundamental that an objection to jurisdiction in the sense of
power cannot be waived; but an objection to the service of process may
be waived. Cf. Western Loan & Savings Co. v. Butte & Boston Co., 210
U. S. 368, 28 Sup. Ct. 720 (1907). Therefore it would seem that in regu-
lating service of process a state does not attempt to modify federal juris-
diction in the sense of power.
37 While it is not inevitable that the non-resident's suit will always be
tried in conjunction with the resident's counter suit, the actual rcsult would
seem to be that they will be tried together. It is suggested that a prac-
tical view be taken of what constitutes "one transaction" taking into con-
sideration how a layman would view it objectively. Compare the analogous
situation in regard to cause of action. CLARK, CODE PLEA ING (1928) 83.
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to dismiss a clearly vexatious counter suit the difficulty is solved.
Such a device is at hand, for, as has been pointed out:
"A direct, simple, and flexible way of meeting the issue [of
the vexatious suit] is to dismiss or stay an action whenever it
appears that some other available forum would better meet the
ends of justice-to recognize something like the civil law plea
of forum non cmnveniens. While American courts have not been
employing the Latin phrase they have been dismissing on
grounds of convenience." 31
As a suggestion for future statutes of this kind, it may prove de-
sirable to obviate this possible objection by requiring the resident
to give suitable bond.
If the resident's suit is not vexatious there seems to be no
reason for preferring one party's convenience in regard to the
transportation of witnesses. Furthermore since the non-resident
has commenced the litigation he would appear to be the logical
one to bring all necessary witnesses for a complete settlement,
especially as he will probably need approximately the same wit-
nesses in both actions. Likewise, although one of the purposes
of the federal system is to give citizens of different states a forum
unprejudiced by state bias, the Massachusetts statute merely
attempts, if the non-resident prefers the federal courts, to sub-
ject him to the same unbiased forum for a decision of the claim
raised, against him.
In view of the current effort to limit the number of cases ap-
pearing in the federal courts,0 the holding of the instant case
has an especially unfortunate result. Should non-residents stand
on an equal footing in both state and federal courts many of the
cases which are now rushed into the federal courts would be de-
cided by stat6 tribunals. But as long as the non-resident is
afforded an immunity in a federal court not enjoyed in a state
court, it is inevitable that the federal forum will be chosen when-
ever possible. ,
PONtER OF COMMERCIAL BANKS TO ACT AS AGENT IN
STOCK PURCHASE TRANSACTIONS
RECENT decisions of the New York Court of Appeals indicate
important developments in the power of banks to act as agent
for an undisclosed principal in stock trading transactions. Such
transactions usually occur where a customer of a bank orders
stock through his bank and arranges for payment either by in-
3s Foster, op. cit. supra note 29, at 1239. Cf. Blair, The Doctoine of
Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 1.




structing the bank to charge an already adequate account or by
negotiating a loan and pledging the ordered stock as collateral,
the bank in either case completing the transaction by a direct
purchase from the broker. In Block v. Pennsylvania Exchange
Bank 2 the plaintiff stockbroker sought damages for breach of
contract occasioned by the refusal of the defendant bank to ac-
cept delivery of certain shares ordered by it while "acting as
agent for a third party or parties unknown." The defendant
alleged the contract was ultra vires and "illegal, void and against
public policy." In an opinion reversing the Appellate Division 2
and upholding the validity of the contract, Chief Judge Cardozo
interpreted the New York Banking Law as permitting a bank
to contract for the purchase of shares where it acted as agent
for an undisclosed principal.
The attitude of the Court of Appeals in the Block case was
foreshadowed by its decision several months previously in Dyer
v. Broadway Central Bank.3 In that case a demurrer interposed
in an action by a broker for damages resulting from the refusal
of a bank to accept delivery of shares ordered by it was over-
ruled, the Court declaring that the contract was not ultra vires
per se and that if any illegality existed it must be set forth in
the pleadings by the defendant bank. In the Block case the
Court sustained its decision by asserting that the business of a
bank is to substitute its credit for the credit of its customer
and that the presence of risk in such a credit substitution, un-
less "so inordinate as to be a speculative enterprise," is no
criterion of the power of a bank to engage in such a transaction.
The Court found this method of transacting business so widely
established as to merit judicial recognition and regarded the ex-
istence of this practice without challenge as leading to the con-
clusion that it is properly within the scope of business incidental
to banking.
Statutes authorizing the business of banking have consistently
been narrowly construed, particularly where there is involved
the ultra vires ownership ofstock.4 Typically these statutes con-
1253 N. Y. 227, 170 N. E. 900 (1930).
2 Block v. Pennsylvania Exchange Bank, 227 App. Div. 711, 236 N. Y.
754 (1st Dep't 1929).
3 252 N. Y. 430, 169 N. E. 635 (1930). The original complaint alleged
that the purchases were made "for and on account of the defendant."
On dismissal of this complaint in the Appellate Division, Dyer v. Broad-
way Central Bank, 225 App. Div. 366, 233 N. Y. Supp. 96 (1st Dep't
1929), it was amended to read: "the plaintiffs, as brokers, at the request
of the defendants, and on its promise to pay therefor immediately on
delivery," purchased the ordered stock. See (1930) 4 ST. JOHN's L. R-v.
291; (1930) 6 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 483.
4California National Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U. S. 362, 17 Sup. Ct. 831
(1897) (ownership of shares in a savings bank illegal); First National
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tain detailed enumerations of banking powers. Contracts in-
volving the exercise of powers not expressed or authorized by
necessary implication have been declared ultra vires and, es-
pecially in the federal courts, not only voidable but void.5 The
peculiarly fiduciary nature of banking, as compared with the
ordinary corporate business,' together with the unprotected posi-
tion of the depositors, has served to justify such strict regula-
tion.7  Consequently the Block decision is apparently a marked
departure from the usual statutory construction, inasmuch as
the applicable New York statute neither specifically grants a
commercial bank power to purchase' stock,s nor, until the instant
Bank v. Converse, 200 U. S. 425, 26 Sup. Ct. 306 (1906) (acceptance of
stock of reorganized corporation in lieu of old claim ultra tircs); Mer-
chants National Bank v. Wehrmann, 202 U. S. 295, 26 Sup. Ct. 613 (1900)
(bank taking shares in partnership as collateral not owner for purposes
of partnership liability) ;- cf. City of Goodland v. Bank of Darlington, 74
Mo. App. 365 (1898). But a national bank can transfer complete title
to stock, though its acquisition was ultra vires. Barren v. McKinnon, 196
Fed. 933 (C. C. A. 1st, 1912).
5 See Greene v. First National Bank, 172 Minn. 310, 313, 215 N. W. 213,
214 (1927), where a bank sold mortgages and guaranteed payment. The
court said that an "implied prohibition against such dealings resulted from
failure of Congress to grant the power." The court further stated that
it is "firmly settled by the federal decisions that a contract made by a
corporation beyond the scope of its powers, express or implied . . . can-
not be enforced or rendered enforceable by the application of the doctrine
of estoppel." Cf. also Schofield v. Goodrich Bros. Banking Co., 98 Fed.
271 (C. C. A. 8th, 1899).
6 See Gause v. Commonwealth, 196 N. Y. 134, 153, 89 N. E. 476, 482
(1909).
7Both national and state banks may accept shares as collateral for a
loan and obtain complete ownership by foreclosure proceedings. West-
minster Bank v. Electrical Works, 73 N. H. 465, 62 Atl. 971 (1906) (bank
entitled to transfer on corporate books); Bennett v. American Bank &
Trust Co., 162 Ga. 718, 134 S. E. 781 (1926) (private foreclosure sale);
Latimer & Inglis v. State Bank, 102 Iowa 162, 71 N. W. 225 (1897);
Haynes v. Kershaw, 22 F. (2d) 735 (C. C4 A. 5th, 1927). Shares ob-
tained in this manner must be disposed of at an early date. Such shares
cannot be supplemented by purchases foi the purpose of getting control
of the corporation. Veigel v. Dakota Trust & Savings Bank, 225 N. W.
657. (S. D. 1929). Cf. (1929) 14 MINN. L. REV. 173.
8N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 3, § 106 (1), similar to the National
Banking Act, provides for the exercise of "all such incidental powers as
shall be necessary to carry on the business ot banking, by discounting
and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange and other evi-
dences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin
and bullion, and by lending money on real or personal security." Other sub-
sections contain specific references to the power to purchase stock and in-
vestment securities. Under § 106 (3) a bank is empowered "to purchase
and hold any stocks or bonds or interest-bearing obligations of the United
States or of the state of' New York or of any city, county, town or village
of this state, the interest on which is not in arrears;" under § 106 (4), to
purchase stock in federal reserve system; under § 106 (5), to purchase stock
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decision, was it supposed to grant such power by implication 0
Moreover, since the defense of incapacity to contract would seem
available to the agent of an undisclosed principal if it were
available had the agent actually been a principal,"0 the fact that
the bank in the Block case acted as an agentu should not, at
least theoretically, have influenced the decision.
It is sometimes said that where the ultra vires contract of a
bank is executed or the bank has received benefits from its par-
tial execution the defense of u-tra. vires is not available.- This
of any New York deposit company, provided the purchase has written
approval of the superintendent of banks; to purchase up to 105 of its
capital and surplus, the capital stock of an investment company, a foreign
banking corporation and the "capital stock of any corporation organized
under section twenty-five-a of the federal reserve act and having its home
office in the state of New York."
9 In Jemison v. Citizens Savings Bank, 122 N. Y. 135, 25 N. E. 264
(1890), the defendant savings bank bought and sold cotton for future de-
livery through the plaintiffs, members of the cotton exchange in New York.
The defendant advised the plaintiff it was acting as agent for its cus-
tomers but failed to disclose its customer's name. The Court of Appeals
held the contract ultra vires and, since there had been no transfer to the
defendants of title to the cotton, concluded that the contract had not been
so executed as to estop the bank from setting up this defense. This case
was distinguished in the Block decision on the ground that a savings and
not a commercial bank was involved. But compare on this point Bobb v.
Savings Bank of Louisville, 23 Ky. 817, 64 S. W. 494 (1884); Sistare v.
Best, 88 N. Y. 527 (1882) ; Nassau Bank v. Jones, 95 N. Y. 115 (1884) (no
recovery where bank sued co-principal on stock transaction); Central
National Bank v. White, 139 N. Y. 631, 34 N. E. 1065 (1893) (practice
of a bank purchasing shares indirectly involved).
10 Compare, for example, the case of an infant acting for an undis-
closed principal. "Neither does such a relation afford to third persons who
may deal with the infant agent, that protection which would be insured
to them if the agent were sui juris; for it would not be contended, for
example, that, in the absence of fraud, the infant would be bound by an
implied warranty of authority, or that, failing to bind his principal, he
bound himself." MlECHEMi, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 155.
3" A number of cases involving both state and national banks have held
the attempt of a bank to act as broker or agent an idtra vires act. First
National Bank v. Hoch, 89 Pa. 324 (1879); Enmerling v. First National
Bank, 97 Fed. 739 (C. C. A. 8th, 1899); L'Herbette v. Pittsfield National
Bank, 162 Mass. 137, 38 N. E. 368 (1884); Hotchkin v. Third National
Bank, 219 Mass. 234, 106 N. E. 974 (1914) (bank's contract to sell stock
for undisclosed principal not enforceable by buyer); Weckler v. First Na-
tional Bank, 42 Md. 581 (1875). Cf. Jemison v. Citizens Savings Bank,
supra note 9.
22 Cf. American Surety Co. v. Phillipine National Bank, 245 N. Y. 116,
156 N. E. 634 (1927). The plaintiff successfully defeated a plea of ,ltra
vires raised by a bank on its contract of indemnity where it had received
"the full benefit of the plaintiff's performance." As is pointed out in (1928)
28 COL. L. Rsv. 101, however, the benefit received by the bank under the
peculiar facts of the case approached a nullity. City of Goodland v. Bank
of Darlington, supra note 4 (purchase of stock in another bank not being
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is usually true, however, only outside the federal courts." By
applying this reasoning to the instant situation the Court might
have allowed the plaintiff broker to recover, since, under prevail-
ing New York decisions, upon completion of the purchase the
broker becomes a pledgee of the stock and the broker's customer
the pledgor, despite the absence of physical delivery to the
customer.14  The contract of purchase might thus be considered
as executed. Such decisions, however, based on the execution
or non-execution of a contract, appear more technical than per-
suasive; it is believed the outcome of cases involving stock pur-
chases on the part of the bank depends rather upon the opinion
of the court as to the seriousness of the risks to which general
depositors are subjected1 5 by the allegedly illegal transaction. 0
malum in se nor malum prohibitum, but only ultra vires, purchasing bank
was held for double liability); Citizens Bank v. Bank of Waddy, 126 Ky.
169, 103 S. W. 249 (1907) (recovery by plaintiff where amount of loan to
bank exceeded its borrowing powers).
13 Cf. First National Bank v. National Exchange Bank, 92 U. S. 122
(1875) ; California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U. S. 362, 17 Sup. Ct. 831 (1897) ;
Concord Bank v. Hawkins, 174 U. S. 364, 9 Sup. Ct. 739 (1899) (benefits
received in the form of dividends). See 3 CooX, CORPORATIONS (8th ed.
1923) § 681: "In the Federal Courts . . . the old rule against ultra vires
contracts is upheld in all its rigor and applied with all its severity." But
cf. Citizens Central National Bank v. Appleton, 216 U. S. 196, 30 Sup. Ct.
364 (1910) (national bank held to extent of benefits received on guaranty
of payment); Carr v. National Bank & Loan Co., 43 App. Div. 10, 59 N. Y.
Supp. 618 (4th Dep't, 1899), aff'd, 167 N. Y. 375, 60 N. E. 649 (1901). But
the ultra. vires act does not relieve the bank of obligation to account for
securities given it as agent for investment or collection. Enmerling v.
First National Bank, 97 Fed. 739 (C. C. A. 8th, 1899); City National Bank
v. Martin, 70 Tex. 643, 8 S. W. 507 (1888) (bank liable for proceeds of item
given it for collection) ; 'L'Herbette v. Pittsfield National Bank, supra note
10 (unenforceable brokerage agreement does not prevent recovery of money
left with bank for investment). Cf. Verrill v. First National Bank, 80 Ore.
550, 157 Pac. 813 (1916).
14 Markham v. Jandon, 41 N. Y. 235 (1869); Content v. Banner, 184
N. Y. 121, 76 N. E. 913 (1906). Both decisions involved suits by customers
against brokers for conversion of stock, which in the first of these cases
was bought on margin. It does not appear in either the Dyer or the Block
case whether the purchases were on margin but Mr. Justice Frankenthalor
in Dyer v. Broadway Central Bank, 130 Misc. 842, 843, 225 N. Y. Supp.
525, 526 (Sup. Ct. 1927) said in part: "The legal effect of a broker's pur-
chase of stock for a customer, whether the latter buys on margin or the
broker advances the entire price, is exactly the same as if the stock were
delivered to the customer and then pledged by the latter with the broker
as security for his advances." Cf. Mullen v. Quinlan, 195 N. Y. 109, 87
N. E. 1078 (1909); La Marchant v. Moore, 150 N. Y. 209, 44 N. E. 770
(1896). But ef. Jemison v. Savings Bank, supra note 9.
15 Compare, for example, the risk of loss to depositors in permitting a
bank to pledge its assets to secure deposits, Divide Co. v. Baird, 55 N. D.
45, 212 N. W. '236 (1926), with the loss likely to result from purchasing
stock in an electric company for the sole purpose of lighting the banking
house, Farmers State Bank v. Richter, 48 N. D. 1233, 189 N. W. 243 (1922),
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From the point of view of risk to the depositor one of the most
serious questions raised by the Block decision concerns the pos-
sibility of the subjection of the assets of a bank to a charge
for the payment of stock purchases, even where the bank has
admittedly ordered shares for its own account. While by its
terms the decision does not sanction the purchase of shares by
a bank for speculation or investment purposes, by inference
it invites a broker to rely upon the credit of the bank on any
order for stock received from a bank. Even were the bank to
prove that the shares had been purchased for itself as either a
speculation or investment, the broker would be well justified in
replying that having investigated the powers of a bank and find-
ing it had, by virtue of the present decision, the power to act as
agent, he was warranted in assuming the bank was acting as
agent in the particular transaction.2"
Such a contention on the part of the broker could be supported
by decisions in analogous situations wherein the reasonableness
of relying upon the proper exercise of a duly authorized power
has led the courts to protect those who thus rely. It is well
settled that a bona fide purchaser may recover from the bank the
amount of a certificate of deposit, regular on its face but fraud-
ulently issued."8 Likewise recovery may be had by a bond fide
holder of a note, regularly indorsed in the name of the bank,
even though the indorsement was illegal as being one for the
or from subscribing to shares in a local hospital, Moore v. Fremont State
Bank, 103 Wash. 249, 173 Pac. 1089 (1917). Contracts like that of the
first case are usually declared void, and, although the purchase of stock
in another corporation is ultra vires, the peculiar circumstances made it
permissible in the latter two cases.
36 In American Surety Co. v. Phillipine National Bank supra note 12, at
131, 156 N. E. at 639; Judge Crane remarked that: ".... the mere giving
of a guaranty or of an undertaking is not in or of itself a wrong, illegal,
or beyond the corporate powers of a bank. It all depends on the nature
of the transaction, and the bank's interest in the property." Cf. Citizens
Central National Bank v. Appleton, supra note 13; Gause v. Common-
wealth Trust Co., supra note 6 (trust company's authority to buy and
sell stocks and bonds does not permit indulgence in hazardous promotion
schemes).
37 See Credit Co. v. Howe Machine Co., 54 Conn. 387, 389 (1887), where,
in a case involving an ultra vires acceptance of a draft by the officer of a
commercial corporation, the court succinctly states this proposition: "To
clearly understand those limits [to the rule that one dealing with a corpor-
ation is bound to notice restrictions on its powers], a distinction is to be
observed between the terms of a power and the circumstances under which
it is exercised. Parties may well be required to take notice of the former;
but to require them to have knowledge of the latter would, in many cases,
result in gross misjustice."
is Citizens State Bank v. Security Bank, 222 N. W. 932 (S. D. 1929)
(certificate marked "not negotiable"). Cf. Harvey Co. v. Cole, 222 Mo. App.
1200, 4 S. W. (2d) 861 (1928).
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accommodation of a third person. 9 Although these decisions usu-
ally involve pUrchases of negotiable paper, the courts proceed
upon the theory that since such acts on the part of the bank
would not be ultra vires if properly exercised, the holder is justi-
fied in assuming there has been no deviation from the bank's
powers in that particular transaction. By analogy in the stock
purchase case the broker might be said to act reasonably in rely-
ing on the bank's agency powers,20 rather than be required to
slow up large transactions by perfunctory inquiries designed to
ascertain ultimate purchasers.
Yet, despite the persuasiveness of these arguments, because
ill advised or speculative stock purchases may precipitate in-
solvency or seriously dissipate an apparently adequate reserve,
the resulting risk to general depositors may be sufficiently se-
rious to lead the courts to refuse the broker recovery where
stock was ordered for the bank's own account. It may be argued
that such a risk is not of any great consequence in view of the
fact that distinctions between stock and securities such as bonds,
which latter are considered a proper investment of the surplus
funds of a bank, have become of diminished importance.2' Yet
it does not appear that stock in general has become so wholly
identified with investment securities, at least as concerns the
safety of earnings and absence of market fluctuations, as to
make it interchangeable in a bank's secondary reserve. 2  Aside
from the element of risk to the depositor, mercantile considera-
tions tending to support the Block case, such as the facilitation
of the customer's credit problem with his broker and the advan-
tage of permitting a bank to make loans on easily realized se-
curity, are not available where a bank buys for its own purposes,
Nevertheless, since a trust company in New York possesses gen-
eral agency powers by statute,23 whatever risk resulting from
the misuse of agencypowers is placed on state bank depositors
by the Block case, a similar risk was apparently present before-
hand wherever state or national banks were especially author-
19 Bank of Genesse v. Patchin Bank, 19 N. Y. 312 (1855); Houghton
v. First National Bank, 26 Wis. 663 (1870); MoRsE, BANKS & BANKING
(8th ed. 1928) § 745- (a).
20 This result finds support by comparison with the adequate protection
granted the bona fide purchaser of certificates of shares in a corporation
representing an issue beyond the authorized capitalization. Cf. BALLAN-
TINE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1927) § 138.
21 Cf. Isaacs, Business Secuity and Legal Security (1923) 37 HARv. L
REv. 201, 210; Catchings, Income Out of Common (1929) 21 J. Am. BANKERS'
Ass'N.,880. See statutory sanctions supra note 8.
22 See generally, ATKIN, BANK SECONDARY RESERVE AND, INVESTUENT
POLICIES (1929).
23-N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 3, § 185. Cf. Gauso v. Common-
wealth Trust Co., supra note 6.
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ized to exercise such trust powers.2 ' But if the suit arose in a
federal court against a national bank, where a stricter rule of
ultra, v ires - prevails,25 the equities of the depositor's position
would almost certainly prevail.
With respect to the risk involved under the actual facts of
the Block case, where the bank acted only as an agent for an
undisclosed principal, the fact that such dealings are so common
among banks as well as the fact that the practice apparently
receives the non-committal sanction of the Superintendent of
Banking, provides some evidence tending to prove the risk was
not inordinate.2 6 But the inference in the Block case that any
risk not speculative is permissible in the credit substitutions of
a bank is subject to definite limitations. Well defined restric-
tions have been placed on credit extensions to customers, as for
example where the bank attempts to act as a guarantor or to
accomodate a customer by allowing overdrafts.27  Such credit
risks may be justified as being in essence a loan to the customer
on personal security. But a definite procedure, involving the
functioning of a well established internal machinery, has been
designed for the purpose of passing on such loansY. Not only has
banking experience demonstrated the wisdom of requiring such
procedure but in a number of instances the law itself has in-
sisted upon it, as may be illustrated by the fact that certification
of a check without having the proper credit or cash on hand is
a criminal offense.29 Hence the presence among some banks of a
practice of conducting what is virtually a brokerage business 0
is persuasive of the propriety of such dealing only where it is
2- Cf. PATON, BANKS AND BANK=NG (1926) § 508, where it is suggested
that national banks have no power to act as agent in brokerage tranactions.
But, it is further suggested that since trust powers have been conferred
on national banks, courts may be more inclined "to look upon the accomo-
dation of a customer by acting as his financial agent as a legitimate and
necessary incident to the banking business." Compare the ruling of the
Comptroller of Currency that the provisions of the National Bank and
Federal Reserve Acts relating to investments of the bank's own funds have
no application to investment of funds held in trust. BuLLETL (1919) 143.
- See supra note 4.
2E; See Block v. Pennsylvania Exchange Bank, supra note 1, at 233, 170
N. E. at 902.
27 Cf. First National Bank of Aiken v. Mott Iron Works, 258 U. S. 240,
42 Sup. Ct. 286 (1922); First National Bank v. American National Bank,
173 Mo. 153, 72 S. W. 1059 (1903); MOasE, op. cit. supra note 19, at § 357.
28 Cf. WESTERFIELD, BANKING PRINCIPLES AND PRAcTXCE (1928) c. 29
and 30.
29 40 STAT. 972 (1918); 12 U. S. C. § 501 (1926).
3o It -would seem that investment affiliates are in a safer position to
handle this type of business. With the growth of branch, chain and group
banking, perhaps even the smaller banks can provide a completely inde-
pendent window or department where the buying and selling of shares
may be safely conducted.
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demonstrated that regulatory devices, designed to protect the
financial health of the bank, have been equally well developed.
In view of the recent assumption and authorization of erst-
while unpermitted banking functions 3' the Block decision may
be economically sound and purposely designed to recognize a new
banking practice which not only provides a valuable service to
customers, most of whom are bona fide depositors, but which
can be profitably and safely handled by commercial banks. Fur-
thermore, since there have been some well considered efforts di-
rected toward widening the investment powers of banks, it may
be found upon proper investigation that certain stocks offer
sound investment advantages to banks, and that limited powers
should be granted a bank to purchase such stock for its own
account. But bcause of the possible conflict of interests between
general depositors and persons relying on the proper exercise
of the agency powers now permitted, it is suggested that the
problems involved might well be the subject of carefully drafted
legislation.3 2 Such legislation should be directed toward a def-
inition of the agency and investment powers of banks and the
legal position of those relying on such powers. Likewise provi-
sion might well be made for insuring within the bank the proper
use of such powers.
STATUS OF ITEMS FORWARDED FOR COLLECTION AND
REMITTANCE UNDER RECENT BANK COLLECTION
LEGISLATION
THE recent epidemic of bank failures has brought into promin-
ence the question of whether a bank forwarding items for collec-
tion and remittance to a drawee bank stands in the position of a
preferred or general creditor of this latter institution as to the
amount of unremitted or unpaid items received by such a drawee
bank immediately prior to its bankruptcy. This question is
clearly raised in the recent case of Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.
31 The "bond, note and/or debenture" purchasing powers of national
banks were gradually assumed until the practice became so common it was
specifically recognized by the McFadden Act of 1927. 44 STAT. 1228 (1927) ;
1Z U. S. C. A. § 36 (Supp. 1929). Even before the McFadden act, how-
ever, this practice might have been sustained under the bank's general
powers to discount or negotiate notes, drafts and "other evidence of debts."
32 If it should be decided that, in order to protect the general depositor
against stock speculation by his bank, the broker is required to assume the
risk of the defense of ultra vires where the bank was purchasing on its
own -account, the position of the broker would certainly be prejudiced in-
equitably, were the bank to interpose this defense as a shield to the lia-
bility of some favored customer.
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v. Peoples Bank of Darlington,1 where the plaintiff bank for-
warded for collection and remittance checks drawn on the de-
fendant bank. The defendant charged the amounts of the checks
to the respective accounts of the drawers and remitted to the
plaintiff its cashier's check drawn on a third bank. Before pre-
sentment for payment of the cashier's check could be made the
defendant closed its doors, whereupon payment was refused. The
plaintiff claimed a preference in the distribution of the assets
of the defendant under a statute providing that "all items sent
by a bank, whether located within or without the state of South
Carolina, to a bank in South Carolina for collection, are hereby
declared to be a trust fund, and shall be a prior lien on any un-
assigned assets of such collecting bank." 2 The court denied the
claim, holding that the statute was unconstitutional 3 and in any
event was not applicable where there had been "no augmentation
of assets."
In restricting the scope of the statute to cases where there has
been an "augmentation of assets" the court found the phrase
"declared to be a trust fund" suggestive of the creation of a new
fund upon which the trust could operate.4 The basis of this in-
terpretation was the belief that to hold otherwise would "grossly
impair the rights of the general creditors" by depleting the assets
in favor of a creditor whose property was not included in the
assets. Whether or not this belief was well founded there is little
doubt but that the court, in striving to protect such creditors,
freely molded the legislature's words to conform to its own
preconceived opinion respecting the expediency of such a statute.5
2 U. S. Daily, Sept. 13, 1930, at 2165 (S. C. 1930). Rehearing granted,
October, 1930.
2 S. C. Acts, 1927, § 2, 369. The statute seems poorly worded, inasmuch
as it was not intended to make the items the trust fund, but rather the
proceeds of the items.
3 The constitutional objections were directed both against the sufficiency
of the title of the act and against § 1 permitting South Carolina banks
to send items direct to the drawee and to receive a draft in payment without
being liable as for negligence. The court held this to discriminate against
foreign banks. The rationale of this is not clear, for such litigation of
necessity applies only to banks within the state and therefore the exclu-
sion of foreign banks can hardly be discriminatory. Furthermore, the
propriety of passing upon the point at all is doubtful since it is generally
held that the party complaining cannot raise the question of constitu-
tionality on the ground of discrimination unless it is a party discriminated
aginst. See Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U. S. 700, 710, 43 Sup. Ct.
689, 693 (1922); Powell v. Hargrave, 136 S. C. 345, 352, 134 S. E. 380,
382 (1926); 1 COOLEY, CONSTrUTIONAL LIrrATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 340.
4The court adopted the reasons of the Circuit Judge, whose opinion may
be found in the transcript of record.
Prior to the passage of this act it was well settled in South Carolina
that in a situation similar to that in the instant ease the forwarder was
not entitled to a preference. Citizens Bank of Pinewood v. Bradley, 136
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This limitation imposed upon the applicability of the act fol-
lows the view prevailing in the federal," and in a few state,"
courts that to constitute an "augmentation" there must be an
actual increase in the assets. But any distinction between cases
where the items are collected by debiting the drawer's account
and where the proceeds are collected from an outside source ap-
pears of doubtful validity. As has been pointed out, the aug-
mentation requirement may be met by the simple expedient of
having the payer first withdraw the money and then immediately
redeliver it in payment of the collection item." Little justifica-
tion can be found for allowing such a fortuitous circumstance to
govern the financial position of a third party. To emphasize the
element of augmentation, moreover, is to add to the expense,
time and uncertainty of liquidation litigation. The question
whether there has been the requisite increase is of itself often
exceedingly difficult of determination 9 and when it is joined to
the concomitant problems of tracing and identifying the trust
res,10 the resulting uncertainty of outcome seriously jeopardizes
the attainment of an equitable and predictable distribution of
the assets.
Fundamentally the whole controversy over the question raised
by the principal case turns upon the degree of protection which
the general creditors of a bank are to be accorded as against
forwarders of collection items. 1' By means of adhering closely
to the theory of a trust res and juggling the relations of the par-
ticular parties, federal courts and the majority of the state
courts have held the interests of the former to be paramount.1 -
S. C. 511, 134 S. E. 510 (1926); Manuel v. Bradley, 140 S. C. 321, 138
S. E. 815 (1927).
6 American Can Co. v. Williams, 173 Fed. 420 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910); Ellerbe
v. Studebaker Corp., 21 F. (2d) 993 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927); Burnes National
Bank v. Spurway, 28 F. (2d) 40 (S. D. Iowa 1928). See Townsend,
Constructive Trusts and Bank Collections (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 980, 1003
n.86.
7Hecker-Jones-Jewell Milling Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 242 Mass.
181, 136 N. E. 333 (1922); Zimmerli v. Northern Bank & Trust Co., 111
Wash. 624, 191 Pac. 788 (1920).
s See dissent of Faris, J., in Larabee Flour Mills v. First National Bank
of Henryetta, 13 F. (2d) 330, 335 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Tierney, 33 N. M. 498, 502, 270 Pac. 792, 793 (1928); Comment
(1927) 36 YALE L. J. 682; Note (1929) 14 ST. Louis L. REV. 406. But see
Hecker-Jones-Jewell Milling Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., supra note 7,
at 187, 136 N. E. at 335.
9 See Turner, Bank Collections-The Direct Routing Practice (1930)
39 YALE L. J. 468, 487.
olbid. Much of the difficulty is probably due to lack of understanding
of bank practice by the courts and the legal profession. Townsend, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 1011.
1 See Turner, op. cit. supra note 9, at 487.
A preference is denied either on the theory that after collection the
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Various reasons, however, have been brought forward as justify-
ing a balance weighted in favor of the latter. 3 Thus it has been
said that the local depositor, because of his opportunity for ob-
taining first-hand knowledge, should be presumed to have chosen
his depository only after satisfying himself as to its financial
stability, while the forwarder of an item for collection and re-
mittance not only is frequently unavoidably ignorant of what
bank will ultimately receive it, but has no intention of having
the collection proceeds mingled with the general funds of the
bank or of becoming one of its general creditors.=2 The for-
warder, after all, is but a casual patron of a casually selected
bank for the brief period necessary for the consummation of a
particular and limited transaction.
Such considerations as these, together with the recognition
of the need for uniformity in collection rules, 5 have found ex-
pression in recent legislative enactments "I and proposals. These
provide simply for certain preferential claims irrespective of
relation of principal and agent is transformed into that of creditor and,
debtor, Hecker-Jones-Jewell Milling Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., supra
note 7; Love v. Federal Land Bank, 127 So. 720 (Miss. 1930) ; Citizens Bank
of Pinewood v. Bradley, supra note 5; Peters Shoe Co. v. Murray, 31 Tex.
Civ. App. 259, 71 S. W. 977 (1903) ; Townsend, op. cit. supra note 6, at 986;
1 oRSE, BANKS AND BANKING (6th ed. 1928) § 248, or on the theory that
the trust funds cannot be traced, National Bank of the Republic v. Porter,
44 Idaho 514, 258 Pac. 544 (1927) ; Salem Elevator Works v. Commissioner
of Banks, 252 Mass. 366, 148 N. E. 220 (1925); cf. (1928) 13 IowA L. REv.
218. For the federal cases see supra note 6.
:13 An increasingly large number of courts have held the proceeds of
collection items indorsed for collection and remittance to be impressed
with a trust and therefore a preferred claim. Skinner v. Porter, 45 Idaho
530, 263 Pac. 993 (1928); Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Millspaugh, 313 Mo.
412, 281 S. W. 733 (1926) ; Sinclair Refining Co. v. Turney, supra note 8;
First State Bank v. O'Bannon, 130 0kla. 206, 266 Pac. 472 (1928); Federal
Reserve Bank v. Peters, 139 Va. 45, 123 S. E. 379 (1924); cf. Edwards v.
Lewis, 98 Fla. 956, 124 So. 746 (1929); Comment (1927) 30 Y,= L. J.
684; 2 PATON, DIGEST (1926) 1451a; Townsend, op. cit. supra note 0, at
987 n.33. See Notes (1923) 24 A. L. R. 1152; (1926) 42 A. L. R. 754;
(1927) 47 A. L. R. 176L For criticisms of this view see (192G) 35 YA,=
L. J. 627; (1926) 75 U. PA. L. REV. 69; (1930) 36 W. VA. L. Q. 297.
14 Comment (1927) 36 YAm L. J. 688. In addition the granting of a
preference would to a large extent offset the increased risks forced upon
the forwarder by the direct routing practice.
15 The enormous number of bank failures in recent years (see the monthly
reports in the FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN and the WORLD ALmmAC (1930)
296), coupled with the chaotic state of the law, has emphasized the need
for some uniform code of rules which will "expedite and simplify" liquida-
tion proceedings.
16 The trend in recent legislation has been toward the allowance of a
preferred claim. Colo. Laws 1925, c. 63; GA. ANN. CoDE (Michie, Supp.
1930) § 2366 (70); Iowa Acts 1929, c. 30, § 11; La. Laws 1926, No, 63;
N. C. CODE (1927) c. 14, § 218; Utah Laws 1927, c. 49; Wyo. Laws 1929,.
e. 141.
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whether there has been an "augmentation of assets" or of
whether the proceeds can be traced and identified. In 1928 the
American Bankers' Association drafted a code of collection rules
providing that if at the time of presentment for payment the
drawee bank has on deposit to the credit of the drawer an amount
sufficient to meet the item, the owner is entitled to a preferential
claim upon the assets.' This has now been adopted in eleven
states,28 including South Carolina, 1 but the attainment of uni-
formity even within state lines has been rendered doubtful at the
outset by the possible inapplicability of state legislation of this
character to national banks.2 Recently, however, a hearing.has
been had before the Committee on Banking and Currency in the
House of Representatives On a bill proposing that the transferor
of a negotiable instrument sent to a national bank for collection
shall be a preferred creditor "if such negotiable instrument is
drawn against the delivery of an accompanying document of
title relating to real or personal property." 21 This bill, of course,
grants a preference only in a limited class of transactions.
Much of the criticism directed against the solution provided
TT Note (1929) 43 HARv. L. RaV. 307. Fault may be found with this
provision in that inferentially it permits a preference only if the drawer's
account is sufficient to meet the item at the time of presentment. Situa-
tions may be imagined where the drawer has delayed making arrange-
ments to meet the item until after its presentment, or until he has been
informed of its arrival. No good reason appears for denying a pre-
ference in such a case.
28Ind. Acts 1929, c. 164; Ky. Acts 1930, c. 13; Md. Laws 1929, c. 454;
Mo. Laws 1929, p. 205; Neb. Laws 1929, c. 41; N. J. Laws 1929, c. 270;
N. M. Laws 1929, c. 138; N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 589; S. C. Acts 1930, p.
1368; Wash. Laws 1929, c. 203; Wis. Laws 1929, c. 354.
19 This act, which was passed subsequent to the commencement of the
action in the Wachovia case, would seem to be open to the same objections
-which the South Carolina court directed against the earlier statute.
2o The distribution of the assets of an insolvenb national bank is governed
by the National Banking Act, which expressly provides for a ratable dis-
tribution. 13 STAT. 114 (1864), 12 U. S. C. § 194 (1926). The recognition
of preferred claims is due to court decisions alone, and is limited to those
cases where the claimant is able to show a trust relationship with the bank,
an augmentation of assets produced by property held in trust for him by
the bank, and identification of the funds in the hands of the receiver. See
cases cited supra note 6. It is questionable therefore whether this narrow
theory of preference claims can be broadened by state legislation as un-
restricted in scope as is the Bankers' Code. See Davis v. Elmira Savings
Bank, 161 U. S. 275, 283, 16 Sup. Ct. 502, 503 (1896); First National
Bank v. Selden, 120 Fed. 212, 215 (C. C. A. 7th, 1903); Palo Alto County
v. Ulrich, 199 Iowa 1, 5, 201 N. W. 132, 133 (1924) ; Giberston v. Northern
Trust Co., 53 N. D. 502, 509, 207 N. W. 42, 44 (1925); cf. Cook County
'National Bank v. United States, 107 U. S. 445, 2 Sup. Ct. 561 (1882); 27
Or. ATT'Y GEN. 37 (1908); 2 MORSE, op. cit. supra note 12, at §§ 200, 250 (e).
21 HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMBIITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY ON
H. R. 5634 (May 16, 1930).
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by the various statutes is based upon the belief, expressed in the
Wachovia case, that in subjecting all the assets to preferential
claims the general creditors would be deprived of the protection
to which they are justly entitled. And there is substantial sup-
port for this belief. On equitable grounds a bank's general
creditors, among which are its depositors, should be assured
protection commensurate with their status as an important, if
not the most important, class of bank customers.- The enlarge-
ment of the class of preferred creditors effected by these laws
would clearly result in a material diminution of the funds ordin-
arily available for ratable distribution. While there are no exact
data permitting comparison between disbursements of assets to
general creditors and those to preferred claimants, the amount
going to the latter is already unquestionably large.2 Any fur-
ther increase should be made only upon full consideration of the
conflicting interests involved.
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have drafted a
tentative code of collection rules w4 hich takes this point into
consideration. A trust to the amount of the item is created and
the proceeds are deemed traced into the general assets of the
bank exclusive of its bank buildings, fixtures and real estate. 
Thus only the relatively liquid assets are subject to preferred
claims, leaving the fixed assets for the general creditors. In
this manner a more equitable distribution of the assets is pro-
vided for by recognizing the preferred character of the claims
of forwarders of collection items without unduly jeopardizing the
rights of the general creditors.
2 2 Bank deposit guarantee laws passed by a few states in an attempt
to provide this protection to depositors have failed of their purpose and
have for the most part been repealed. See Butts, State Regzdation rof
Banking by Guarantee of Deposits (1929) 2 Bliss. L. J. 208.
2 3 1n the fiscal year ending October 31, 1929, out of $25,215,143, the
total distributable assets of 103 insolvent national banks, the unsecured
depositors, with claims aggregating $25,714,590 received only $12,653,830,
while the preferred and secured creditors, who were paid in full, received
$12,561,313. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY
(1929) 24, 25. In North Carolina, out of $1,211,100.17, the total assets
distributed, the depositors received $567,263.10, and the preferred creditors
$180,409.17. NORTH CAROLINA COMMISSION REPORTS OF THE CONDITION OF
THE STATE BANicS (Dec. 31, 1928) VI.
24 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COiMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS (1929) 261.
2 Ibid § 23.
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SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTIONS BASED ON THE SAME EVI-
DENCE AS DOUBLE JEOPARDY
THE possibility of splitting what appears to be a single criminal
transaction into various component offenses, when combined with
the prolific creation of new statutory offenses, tends to render
the determination of identity of criminal offenses with respect to
a plea of double jeopardy increasingly difficult. Some few courts
pass upon the propriety of this plea in a particular instance by
inquiring whether the offenses are identical in the sense that the
facts which gave rise to both prosecutions were a part of the
same transaction.1 Most jurisdictions, however, while purport-
ing to follow a common majority rule, have variously phrased the
test of what constitutes identity of offenses. Thus it has been
declared that "if the evidence, which is necessary to support the
second indictment, was admissible under the former, was related
to the same crime, and was sufficient, if believed by the jury, to
have warranted a conviction of that crime, the offenses are iden-
tical" but that "if the facts which will convict on the second
prosecution would not necessarily have convicted on the first then
the first will not be a bar." 2 Other courts following this so-called
"same evidence" test phrase it in the following manner: "unless
the first of the two indictments was such [that] the prisoner
might have been convicted [of the crime alleged therein] upon
proof of the facts contained in the second, an acquittal or con-
viction on the first can be no bar to the second." a
Any discussion of the comparative merits of the majority
"same evidence" and minority "same transaction" tests will be
excluded. Rather it is proposed to indicate the sources of con-
flict inherent in the majority rule and to suggest a modification
of the various statements of that rule so as to permit a higher
degree of predictability of result.
In furtherance of this purpose, it would seem essential at the
very outset to determine whether the "evidence" to which refer-
'New Jersey alone has consistently adhered to the same transaction test.
State v. Mowser, 92 N. J. L. 474, 106 Atl. 416 (1919); State v. Cosgrove,
103 N. J. 'L. 412, 135 Atl. 871 (1927). The test has been applied in Ala-
bama, Oklahoma and Texas. Haraway v. State, 22 Ala. App. 553, 117 So.
612 (1928); Trawick y. Birmingham, 23 Ala. App. 308, 125 So. 211 (1929);
Gates v. State, 100 Tex. Cr. 36, 271 S. W. 632 (1925); Doherty v. State,
24 S. W. (2d) 60 (Tex. 1930); Rochderffer v. State, 34 Okla. Cr. 215,
245 Pac. 902 (1926) ; Crane v. State, 39 Okla. Cr. 41, 263 Pac. 174 (1928).
But instances may be found, in these latter jurisdictions, where the court
has reached a result inconsistent with the same transaction test. Holcomb
v. State, 19 Ala. App. 24, 94 So. 917 (1922); Alarcon v. State, 92 Tex. Cr.
288, 242 S. W. 1056 (1922).
2 Medlock v. Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 718, 720, 288 S. W. 670, 671 (1926).
3 State v. McGaughey, 45 S. D. 379, 383, 187 N. W. 717, 718 (1922);
Commonwealth v. Crowley, 257 Mass. 590, 595, 154 N. E. 326, 328 (1926).
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ence is made in the first statement of the majority rule means
the evidence which will be produced in the second prosecution,
the evidential facts alleged in the second indictment, or the essen-
tial facts alleged in the second indictment. The decisions would
indicate a tendency to adopt the last view. Where it has been
necessary to distinguish between the evidence to be produced in
the second prosecution and the facts alleged in the second indict-
ment, the latter has been held the determining factor.' If, how-
ever, the courts adopt the view that the second prosecu-
tion is barred if the evidentiary facts alleged in the second in-
dictment are sufficient to convict of the offense charged in the
first indictment, it is believed that the issue of double jeopardy
may often turn upon the accidental inclusion of superfluous
allegations. Thus an allegation in a prosecution for statutory
rape that "the defendant had intercourse with his daughter, a
child under the age of consent" would be sufficient to have sup-
ported a conviction of incest charged in a former indictment and
thus to constitute the second prosecution double jeopardy despite
the fact that the allegation of relationship was immaterial to
the charge of rape. Accordingly the better view would seem
to be that requiring the essential facts to be sufficient to have
convicted of the former offense.
For the purposes of this discussion, the cases in which a plea
of double jeopardy has been raised may be grouped into two
classes. In the first class will fall those cases where each of the
two offenses charged in successive indictments contains at least
one essential element which is not included in the other offense,
while there may or may not be an element common to each of-
fense. The second class will include those cases where one of
the two offenses is included in its entirety in the other greater
offense which consists of the former offense plus an additional
element.
The result which will be reached by the courts in those cases
which fall with the first class may be predicted with a high
degree of certainty despite the diverse and careless statements
of the majority test. The reason for such uniformity lies in the
fact that the essential facts alleged in the second indictment can-
not possibly convict of an offense which contains an essential
element not included in the offense charged in the second prose-
cution. So long, therefore, as the courts continue to construe
the test as requiring the essential facts alleged in the second
indictment to be sufficient to convict of the offense charged in
the first indictment, conflicting decisions cannot be reached in
4 In People v. Brannon, 70 Cal. App. 225, 232, 233 Pac. 88, 91 (192), the
court said: "The true test is, could the defendant have been convicted upon
the first indictment upon proof of the facts, not as brought forward in
evidence but as alleged in the record of the second."
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this class of cases. Thus where there are successive prosecu-
tions, or a prosecution on separate counts in the same indictment,
foil a conspiracy to commit a substantive offense and for the
commission of the offense, the plea of double jeopardy will be
disallowed,5 unless, by statute, a definite substantive offense and a
conspiracy to commit such offense have been declared to be de-
grees of each other and conviction for either may be had under
an indictment charging the other.0 Likewise, where there are
successive prosecutions for murder occurring during the com-
mission of a felony and for the felony itself, a prosecution for
burglary or robbery following a prosecution for murder does
not constitute double jeopardy. 7 Similarly, successive prosecu-
tions for burglary and larceny,8 robbery and burglary, " burglary
and receiving stolen property,10 larceny and knowingly possessing
stolen property," carrying a concealed weapon and robbery, mur-
der or assault committed on the same occasion,1 2 manslaughter
and a violation of the motor vehicle laws,13 the commission of an
offense and permitting or instigating it to be done,14 embezzle-
5 Preeman v. United States, 244 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 7th, 1917); Chew v.
United States, 9 F. (2d) 348 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925); Mitchell v. United
States, 23 F. (2d) 260 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927) ; Meucci v. United States, 28 F.
(2d) 508 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928); People v. Clensey, 97 Cal. App. 71, 274
Pac. 1018 (1929) ; Gilpin v. State, 142 Md. 464, 121 Atl. 354 (1923) ; State
v. Nolon, 129 Wash. 284, 224 Pac. 932 (1924).
eEx parte Resler, 115 Neb. 335, 212 N. W. 765 (1927) (murder by
poison) ; Ex parte Berman, 286 Pac. 1043 (Cal. 1930) (bribery).
7People v. Andrae, 305 Ill. 530, 137 N. E. 496 (1922) (burglary); Duvall
v. State, 111 Ohio St. 657, 146 N. E. 90 (1924) (robbery) ; State v. Ragan,
123 Kan. 399, 256 Pac. 169 (1927) (robbery) ; Commonwealth v. Crecorian,
264 Mass. 94, 162 N. E. 7 (1928) (robbery).
- Morgan v. Sylvester, 231 Fed. 886 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916) (separate
counts) ; Alarcon v. State, supra note 1 (separate counts) ; People v. Snyder,
241 N. Y. 81, 148 N. E. 796 (1925) (successive prosecutions); State V.
Monterieffe, 165 La. 296, 115 So. 493 (1928) (successive prosecutions).
9 People v. Brain, 75 Cal. App. 109, 241 Pac. 913 (1925) ; People v. Case,
77 Cal. App. 477, 246 Pac. 1083 (1926).
10 State v. Broderick, 191 Iowa 717, 183 N. W. 310 (1921); Alarcon v.
State, supra note 1.
11 Singleton v. United States, 294 Fed. 890 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923).
12Hopkins v. State, 79 Tex. Cr. 490, 186 S. W. 201 (1916) (murder);
Cooper v. State, 16 Ala. App. 76, 75 So. 624 (1917) (assault with intent
to murder); Young v. State, 87 Tex. Cr. 184, 222 S. W. 1103 (1920)
(assault); People v. Perry, 99 Cal. App. 90, '277 Pac. 1080 (1929) (rob-
bery); State v. Lopez, 169 La. 247, 125 So. 65 (1929) (cattle stealing).
13 People v. Wilson, 193 Cal. 512, 226 Pac. 5 (1924); State v. Cheeseman,
63 Utah 138, 223 Pac. 762 (1924) ; State v. Empey, 65 Utah 609, 239 Pae.
25 (1925) ; People v. McKee, 80 Cal. App. 200, 251 Pac. 675 (1926) ; Smith
v. State, 159 Tenn. 674, 21 S. W. (2d) 400 (1929).
14 Commonwealth v. Porter, 237 Mass. 1, 129 N. E. 298 (1921) (commis-
sion of lewd practices and keeping house where such practices occurred) ;
Tobin v. State, 36 Wyo. 368, 255 Pac. 788 (1927) (conducting gambling
game and permitting game to be played).
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ment of chattels and embezzlement of money proceeds, 15 obtain-
ing money under false pretenses and larceny," obtaining money
under false pretenses and forgery, 7 receiving a bribe and larceny
by false pretenses, 8 have all been held not to warrant a plea of
double jeopardy.
With respect to other typical situations in the first class of
cases in which the plea of double jeopardy is unlikely to succeed,
there would seem a virtual uniformity in holding that where the
defendant by the same act or successive acts upon the same
occasion, commits offenses against two persons, successive prose-
cutions for the offense against each do not constitute double
jeopardy. Such are cases of simultaneous robbery or murder of,
or assault upon, two persons. Virtually no conflict is found
where there has been a conviction under the first indictment.10
And even after there has been an: acquittal under the first in-
dictment there is no conflict where there was an obvious "intent"
directed against each of the persons injured.1 Where such "in-
tent," however, was directed wholly against one, and a bystander
was "unintentionally" injured; the majority of courts have held
that an acquittal of the offense against either baits a prosecution
for the offense against the other, on the ground that the prior ac-
quittal operates to acquit of the criminal intent essential to each
offense.21 This result has been approved by legal writers despite
15 People v. Nelson, 70 Cal. App. 476, 233 Pac. 406 (1925) ; State v. Folger,
204 Iowa 1296, 210 N. W. 580 (1926).
:6 People v. Kirsch, 204 Cal. 599, 269 Pac. 447 (1928).
" Binganan v. State, 181 Ark. 94, 24 S. W. (2d) 969 (1930).
s Commonwealth v. Crowley, supra note 3.
19 Seiwald v. People, 66 Colo. 332, 182 Pac. 20 (1919) (murder of police-
man and the person robbed); State v. Williams, 263 S. W. 195 (Mo. 1924)
(robbery of X and assault with intent to rob Y); Wallace v. Common-
wealth, 207 Ky. 122, 268 S. W. 809 (1925). Contra: Smith v. State, supra
note 13. In this last case the court draws a distinction between a single
muscular reaction, one shot, and successive acts which are part of the same
transaction, successive shots. This distinction has received practically no
support elsewhere. People v. Vaughn, 215 Ill. App. 452 (1919). See Com-
monwealth v. Anderson, 169 Ky. 372, 376, 183 S. W. 898, 899 (1916);
State v. Corbitt, 117 S. C. 356, 383, 109 S. E. 133, 142 (1921).
2b People v. Rodgers, 184 App. Div. 461, 171 N. Y. Supp. 451 (1st Dep't
1918) (attempt to rob X and Y) ; People v. Stephens, 297 Ill. 91, 130 N. E.
459 (1921) (murder of one policeman and assault on another); State v.
Corbitt, supra note 19 (murder of two persons) ; State v. Billoto, 104 Ohio
St. 13, 135 N. E. 285 (1922) (same); Johns v. State, 130 Bliss. 803, 95 So.
84 (1923) (robbery of two persons); Blevins v. State, 20 Ala. App. 229,
101 So. 478 (1924) (murder of two persons by confederates); Common-
wealth v. Melissari, 298 Pa. 63, 148 Atl. 45 (1929) (murder of two persons).
21 State v. Houchins, 102 W. Va. 169, 134 S. E. 740 (192G) ; Moss v. State,
16 Ala. App. 34, 75 So. 179 (1917) ; Spannell v. State, 83 Ton. Cr. 418, 203
S. W. 357 (1918); Ruffin v. State, 29 Ga. App. 214, 114 S. E. 581 (1922).
Contra: People v. Brannon, 70 Cal. App. 225, 233 Pac. 88 (1925); State
v. Labbee, 134 Wash. 55, 234 Pac. 1049 (1925).
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the fact that such a decision is apparently inconsistent with the
test of identity of offenses as set forth by the majority rule.2
It is suggested, however, that this inconsistency is more apparent
than real inasmuch as the true basis for barring the second
prosecution is not double jeopardy but res judicata. 3 Although
the mere proof of an acquittal of an offense containing an ele-
ment essential to the guilt of an offense charged in a later in-
dictment will not necessarily result in barring the second prose-
cution on grounds of res judicata, it is clear that where it can
be proved to the satisfaction of the court that the prior acquittal
was based upon a finding in favor of the defendant as to this
factual element such a finding is conclusive in the subsequent
prosecution.
There remains to be considered the situation where one of the
two offenses is included in its entirety in a greater offense, which
consists of the first offense plus an additional element. It is in
this type of case that the confusion of decisions predicated upon
the majority test of identity of offenses reaches such a height
that any attempt at prediction of iesult is no better than a guess.
This situation has most frequently arisen during the past fifteen
years in cases involving violations of the prohibition laws. A
few of the combinations of offenses most frequently adjudicated
in this field are: possession and sale of the same liquor; posses-
sion and transportation of the same liquor; possession and manu-
facture of the same liquor; and manufacture of liquor and
possession of the still used.
Where the prosecution for possession of liquor is subsequent
in time, the application of the majority test of identity of offenses
will not result in barring the second prosecution since the facts
alleged in an indictment charging possession would not be suffi-
cient to convict of sale, manufacture or transportation. 4 Yet
many courts have held the prosecution for possession to be barred
where there has been a conviction of the greater offense and
where the only possession charged or to be proved is that which
was incident to the ,sale,25 manufacture2 or transportation. "
22 (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 324; Comment (1925) 14 CALIF. L. REV. 133.
23 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 648.
24 It is only by a reverse application of the test that the second prosecu-
tion would be barred by virtue of the test of identity.of offenses. The
terms of the test clearly do' not authorize this.
25 Newton v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 707, 249 S. W. 1017 (1923) ; Whit-
ten v. State, 94 Tex. Cr. 144, 250 S. W. 165 (1923); Plunk v. State, 96
Tex. Cr. 205, 256 S. W. 922 (1923). Contra: State v. Nodine, 121 Ore. 657,
256 Pac. 387 (1927). Cf. State v. Axley, 121 Kan. 881, 250 Pac. 284 (1926)
(prosecution for possession and sale on separate counts not double jeop-
ardy); State v. Marchindo, 65 Mont. 431, 211 Pac. 1093 (1922) (same);
State v. Ford, 117 Kan. 735, 232 Pac. 1023 (1925) (same). But of. Gray
v. United States, 14 F. (2d) 366 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) (error to impose
separate sentences for possession and sale since possession is merged in
[ol. 40
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These decisions reason that a conviction or acquittal of a greater
degree of an offense bars a subsequent prosecution for a lesser
degree of the offense, which is included therein whenever a con-
viction for the lesser degree might have been had under the
indictment charging the greater degree. Whether or not a con-
viction of the lesser degree as such may be had under an in-
dictment charging the greater degree will often be provided for
by statute. But the absence of such a statutory provision will
not necessarily be conclusive, for it has been held that, even
without such provision, a conviction of the greater degree will
bar a prosecution for a lesser degree since a conviction of the
greater degree is also a conviction of the lesser23 An acquittal
of the greater degree, however, will not bar a prosecution for
the lesser, in the absence of such statutory provision, since the
defendant might be innocent of the greater while guilty of the
lesser.?9
Although nothing in the accepted rule of identity of offenses
forces a court to hold a prosecution for a lesser degree of an
offense to be barred by a conviction of a greater degree, no court
which has yet been faced with this situation has failed so to hold.
sale) ; Commonwealth v. Heston, 292 Pa. 501, 141 Atl. 287 (1928) (error
to impose separate sentences for possession and sale of narcotics).
26 Barton v. State, 26 Okla Cr. 150, 222 Pac. 1019 (1924). Crmora: Alorgan
v. State, 28 Ga. App. 358, 111 S. E. 72 (1922); of. Dexter v. United States,
12 (2d) 777 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926) (conviction on separate counts for manu-
facture and possession held error); Goetz v. United States, 39 F. (2d)
903 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930) (same).
27 Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 201 Ky. 729, 258 S. W. 297 (1924); Coon
v. State, 97 Tex. Cr. 645, 263 S. W. 914 (1924); of. State v. Clark, 289
S. W. 963 (Mo." 1927) (conviction on two counts for transportation and
possession held error) ; French v. State, 159 Tenn. 451, 19 S. W. (2d) 276
(1929) (error to impose separate sentence for transportation and pos-
session).
2 In Gray v. United States, supra note 25, at 368, the court said: "In
order that an acquittal be a bar to a subsequent indictment for the lesser
crime it would seem to be essential that a conviction of such crime might
have been had under the indictment for the greater. If a conviction might
have been had and -was not, there was an implied acquittal. But where
a conviction for a less crime cannot be had under an indictment for a
greater which includes it, then it is plain that while an acquittal would
not or might not be a bar, a conviction of the greater crime would involve
the lesser also and would be a bar." In Barton v. State, supra note 26, at
1019, the court, in holding a prosecution for possession to be barred by a
conviction of manufacture, said: "It is well settled everywhere that a
conviction for an offense will bar a subsequent conviction of a lesser
degree of that offense or for an offense that is a necessary ingredient of
the offense for -which a conviction has already been had where both prose-
cutions grow out of the same transaction."
29 Mullins v. Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 182, 286 S. W. 1042 (1926) (acquit-
tal of unlawful gift); Commonwealth v. Ladusaw, 226 Ky. 386, 10 S. W.
(2d) 1089 (1928) (acquittal of manufacture).
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The conflict of decisions is due, rather, to opposing conclusions
as to whether a given offense is included in another. Thus the
federal courts have held the possession of liquor or of the still
to be essential ingredients of the greater offense of manufacture
or sale and wholly included therein30 State courts have split
upon this question.31 The result reached by the federal courts
seems to be founded on sound reasoning where the only posses-
sion charged and to be proved is that possession at the time of
sale, transportation or manufacture. Those state courts which
have reached the opposite conclusion in such a situation have
been forced to a refinement of logic which would do credit to the
early common law pleader. One reason advanced for holding the
possession not to be included in the sale is that the possession,
although it will be proved by evidence of the sale, may be cut
short the instant prior to delivery and hence considered as com-
plete before the sale is consumated. 32 By the same logic, one
might be convicted of murder and subsequently convicted of the
assault which culminated in the murder. Another suggested
explanation of such a result is that possession is not necessarily
included in the sale since one may be guilty of possessing liquor
without selling it or may be guilty of selling liquor which is in
the manual possession of another.33  Yet such a situation is
purely hypothetical where the defendant has already been con-
victed of a sale and is now being prosecuted for the possession
incident to the sale.34 It is contended that the decision whether
one offense is included in another so as to bar a second prose-
cution should depend upon the case before the court rather
than upon the theoretical possibility of a totally irrelevant fact
situation.
Where the prosecution for the lesser crime is prior in time,
however, it would appear that the application of the majority
test of identity of offenses would operate to bar the prosecution
for sale, transportation or manufacture since the facts alleged
30 Gray v. United States, supra note 25 (possession and sale); Dexter
v. United States, supra note 26 (manufacture and possession of liquor
and still used) ; Goetz v. United States, supra note 26 (same).
31 Cases cited supra notes 25, 26, and 27.
32 State v. Ford, supra note 25, at 736, 232 Pac. at 1024.
33 Chandler v. State, 89 Tex. Cr. 599, 601, 232 S. W. 337, 338 (1921).
34 The only other situation in which double jeopardy will be pleaded is
when there has been an acquittal of the greater offense and (1) the of-
fenses are declared by statute to be degrees of each other, or (2) there is
no statutory provision to such effect. In the first case the second prosecu-
tion will be barred regardless of the fact that the defendant might be
guilty of one without being guilty of the other. In the second case, oven
though the court admitted the offenses to be degrees of each other, the
second prosecution would not be barred since there must either be a con-
viction of the greater offense or the possibility of a conviction of the lesser
under the indictment for the greater.
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in the indictment for the greater offense would necessarily con-
vict of a possession which was incident to the greater offense.
A few cases have so held.3 Dicta, but no direct authority, to
the contrary have been found. 0 The majority of courts have
failed to invoke the test of identity of offenses and have rested
their decisions on the principle of degrees of offenses.37 It
would seem clearly that the test of identity of offenses covers
this situation by its terms and from a logical point of view
should be applied. The state, by successive prosecutions for the
possession incident to a sale and for the sale, is clearly guilty of
splitting offenses and the second prosecution should be barred.
It has been seen that the generally accepted rule of identity
of offenses has proved to be inadequate to explain the decisions
involving certain combinations of offenses or to offer a guide to
the decisions in the future. It is therefore proposed that the
rule be modified in the following manner:
"Two offenses are identical so as to render a second prosecution
double jeopardy, if
(1) The essential facts alleged in the second indictment were
admissible under the first indictment and, if proved, would, of
necessity, have convicted of the offense charged in the first in-
dictment, or
(2) The offense charged in the second indictment was included
in its entirety in the greater offense charged in the first indict-
ment and there was a conviction of the greater offense, or might
have been a conviction of the lesser offense under the indictment
charging the greater offense."
COMMERCIAL USE OF THE HIGHWAY AS A BASIS FOR
MOTOR CARRIER REGULATION
THE part which the mammoth bus and giant truck are playing
in present day transportation lends new significance to the prob-
lem of motor-carrier regulation. While the fact that these ve-
hicles do a business which is sometimes "affected with the public
interest" can often be used to subject them to state regulation,
potentially the broadest power which the state can wield to
control motor transportation for hire is to be derived from the
use by these carriers of the public highway., The law has drawn
3
-People v. Cook, 236 Mich. 333, 210 N. W. 296 (1926) (conviction of
possession bars prosecution for transportation).
36 See Tritico v. United States, 4 F. (2d) 664, 665 (C. C. A. 5th, 1925).
37 Gordon v. State, 127 liss. 396, 90 So. 95 (1921) (conviction of posses-
session no bar to prosecution for manufacturing); Ussery v. State, 37
Ga. App. 345, 140 S. E. 427 (1927) (same).




a distinction between the ordinary use of the highway for travel,
and its use for purposes of private gain. A vehicle on the road
for the former purpose is there as of "right;" one using it in
the latter manner has only a "privilege" of use.2 Obviously,
busses, trucks, taxis, and jitneys, whether employed as "com-
mon" or "private" carriers, belong to this latter class. In the
absence! of a "right" to be on the highway, theirs is merely a
"privilege" which can be, at least in theory, revoked by the state
at any time and for any reason.
The use of public roads for gain as a source of power for
state regulation of commercial highway traffic is an old, even
if somewhat neglected doctrine. It seems to have evolved from
the elementary common law rule that any permanent obstruction
of the highway was a nuisance., At an early date it was held
that the appropriation of a fixed part of the highway for the
purposes of a private business constituted such an obstruction 4
unless sanctioned by the legislature.; With the advent of motor
traffic, the fact that commercial vehicles were likewise using the
roads for purposes of gain was deemed a sufficient basis for
declaring their use of the highway a matter of "privilege" and
not of "right," even though they obstructed no fixed portion of
the road permanentlye
Carried to its extreme, such a rule as this, making legislative
permission a necessary condition precedent to the privilege of
2 See Carson v. Woodram, 95 W. Va. 197, 201, 120 S. E. 512, 513 (1923),
and cases cited infra note 6.
8 2 ELLIOT, RoADs AND STREETS (4th ed. 1926) § 827.
4 Costello v. State, 108 Ala. 45, 18 So. 820 (1895) (setting up a fruit-
stand on the street); Rex v. Jones, 3 Camp. 229 (1812) (sawing wood on
the highway).
5Regina v. Longton Gas Co., 2 El. & EL 650 (1860); Jersey City Gas
Co. v. Dwight, 29 N. J. Eq. 242 (1878). See Ex Parte Dickey, 76 W. Va.
576, 579, 85 S. E. 781, 782 (1915).
6 See Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 144, 44 Sup. Ct. 25T, 259 (1924);
Nolen v. Riechman, 225 Fed. 812, 823 (W. D. Tenn. 1915) ; Lutz v. City of
New Orleans, 235 Fed. 978, 981 (E. D. La. 1916); Schoenfeld v. City of
Seattle, 265 Fed. 726, 731 (W. D. Wash. 1920); Schlesinger v. City of At-
lanta, 161 Ga. 148, 161, 129 S. E. 861, 867 (1925); Chicago Motor Coach
Co. v. Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 207, 169 N. E. 22, 25 (1929); Huston v. City
of Des Moines, 176 Iowa 455, 477; 156 N. W. 883, 892 (1916); Decker v.
City of Wichita, 109 Kan. 796, 798, 202 Pac. 89, 90, (1921); State v. Bar-
belais, 101 Me. 512, 514, 64 Atl. 881 (1906); Melconian v. City of Grand
Rapids, 218 Mich. 397, 404, 188 N. W. 521, 524 (1922); Willis v. Buck, 81
Mont. 472, 481, 263 Pac. 982, 984 (1928); Morin v. Nunan, 91 N. 1. L.
506, 508, 103 Atl. 378, 379 (1918); Philadelphia Jitney Association v.
Blankenburg, 24 Pa. D. & C. 1000, 1007 (1915); City of Memphis v. State,
133 Tenn. 83, 97, 179 S. W. 631, 635 (1915); Greene v. San Antonio, 178
S. W. 6, 7 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); Ex parte Sepulveda, 108 Tex, Cr. Rep.
533, 535, 2 S. W. (2d) 445, 446 (1928); Ex parte Dickey, supra note 5;
Carson v. Woodram, supra note 2; Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 657, 660,
168 Pac. 516, 518 (1917).
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using the highway for business purposes, might completely sub-
ject motor carriers to the capricious fancy of state legislatures.
Indeed, it has been argued that the control of the state over car-
riers on the highway is thus absolutely plenary,- and a few
courts have thereby sustained, against constitutional attack, ex-
treme and seemingly unreasonable motor regulations S
More important, however, are the cases in which a disregard
of the merely privileged position of commercial vehicles on the
highway has led to a declaration of unconstitutionality of rea-
sonable regulations of "private" carriers whose business was
deemed not to be "affected with the public interest." In afici-
gam Public Utihties Commission v. Dztke,o the defendant was a
private carrier transporting automobile bodies from Detroit,
Michigan to Toledo, Ohio. Part of a statute designed to regu-
late transportation for compensation on the highway declared
all motor vehicles engaged in carriage for hire to be "common"
carriers. After holding that the requirement of an operating
permit, the issuance of which was conditioned upon the taking
out of specified insurance, constituted a burden on interstate
commerce when applied to this particular defendant, Justice
Butler, speaking for the United State Supreme Court, declared:
"Moreover, it is beyond the power of the State by legislative
fiat to convert property used exclusively in the business of a
private carrier into a public utility.., for that would be taking
private property for public use without just compensation, which
no State can do consistently with the due process of law clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 10
This dictum evidences a disregard of the distinction between
ordinary and commercial traffic. Even though the ordinary
private business will seldom be regarded as sufficiently "affected
with the public interest" to permit its transformation by legis-
lative enactment into a "public utility" for purposes of regula-
tion, nevertheless, since the "private" carrier is a user of the
public road for business purposes, the legislative power might
well have been regarded as extending to the imposition of public
utility regulations.
In Frost v. Railway Commission of Califrnia, the Supreme
Court of California held that even though the legislature could
7See Allen v. City of Bellingham, 95 Wash. 12, 38, 163 Pac. 18, 27
(1917) ; Schoenfeld v. City of Seattle, supre note 6, at 732.8 Burgess v. Mayor of Brockton, 235 Mass. 95, 126 N. E. 456 (1920)
(jitney licenses revoked, not for any violation of the law, but solely to
prevent a proposed discontinuance of a street railway); Dresser v. City of
Wichita, 96 Kan. 820, 153 Pac. 1194 (1915) (an admittedly prohibitive
license tax held valid).
9 266 U. S. 570, 45 Sup. Ct. 191 (1925).
10 Supra note 9 at 578, 45 Sup. Ct. at 193.
11197 Cal. 230, 240 Pac. 26 (1925).
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not transmute a "private" into a "public" carrier, yet, as it
could entirely withhold the privilege of using the highway for
private gain, it could grant the privilege of such use on what-
ever terms it chose. Upon appeal the United States Supreme
Court took the view that the fact that all commercial traffic is
merely privileged in its use of the highway did not enable the
legislature to subject a "private" carrier to the same regulations
as a "common" one. 12 By its reversal of the decision of the state
court, the Supreme Court arrived at the paradoxical conclusion
that, while the state might exclude "private" carriers from its
roads entirely, it could not allow such vehicles the use of the
highway subject to regulative conditions which would, in other
fields of private enterprise, constitute a deprivation of property."'
There would seem to be no practical reason why many regula-
tions imposed on the "public" carrier should not also be imposed
on the "private" one.14 A vehicle employed in the latter manner
does just as much damage to paving, and just as effectively tends
to delay ordinary travel.15
Not only may the distinction between ordinary and commer-
cial highway travel be utilized to sustain more comprehensive
regulation of "private" carriers by a state, but it may also serve
a municipality in its efforts to regulate "common" carriers en-
gaged in interurban traffic.10 Of course, this dictinction is of
little assistance where the state enactment, conferring upon the
city the control of its streets, is construed as expressly limiting
12 271 U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605 (1926).
lSupra note 12 at 602, 46 Sup. Ct. at 610; In a characteristically short
dissent, Justice Holmes, upholding the regulations in question, says: "The
power to exclude altogether generally includes the lesser power to condi-
tion."
14 The Frost and Duke cases hold that, a "private" carrier cannot be
transmuted into a "common" one, by subjecting it to the same regulations.
They do not preclude regulation of a "private" carrier entirely. See David
E. Lilienthal and Irwin S. Rosenbaum, Motor Carrier Regulation by Certifi-
cates of Necessity and Convenience (1926) 36 YA L. 3. 163, 178. Meas-
ures regulating "private" carriers have been upheld under a correct inter-
pretation of the Frost case. Savage v. Commonwealth, 152 Va. 992, 147
S. E. 262 (1929). However, an Ohio court has misinterpreted the Duke
case, holding that it precluded certification of private carriers. Hissem
v. Guran, 112 Ohio St. 59, 146 N. E. 808 (1925).
15 To distinguish "common" from "private" carriers for regulative pur-
poses is not only a doubtful distinction, but one that is often very hard to
draw. See Heuman v. Powers Co., 175 App. Div. 627, 162 N. Y. Supp. 590
(1st Dep't 1916); Weaver v. Public Service Commission, 40 Wyo. 462, 278
Pac. 542 (1929).
16 Opdyke v. City of Amnston, 16 Ala. App. 436 (1918) ; Gartside v. East
St. Louis, 43 Ill. 47 (1867); Star Transportation Co. v. Mason City, 195
Iowa 930, 192 N. W. 873 (1923); Commonwealth v. Theberge, 231 Mass.
386, 121 N. E. 30 (1918); Cummins v. Jones, 79 Ore. 276, 155 Pac. 171
(1916); Charleston v. Pepper, 1 Rich. 364 (S. C. 1845).
[Vol. 40
COMMENTS
the town to regulation of those commercial vehicles operating
entirely within its limits." Where, however, the power of the
city over interurban motor-carriers is withheld on the ground
that it would constitute a deprivation of property to allow a
municipality to tax or otherwise control these vehicles,13 the
distinction may be of considerable utility. The contention that
municipal regulation of interurban motor carriers constitutes
an unreasonable deprivation of property may be supported
if the municipality's power of regulation extends only to
motor carriers whose business is "affected with the pub-
lic interest" of the municipality. But if a city which has
been given control of its streets be regarded as controlling
interurban commercial traffic not as an industry but as a user
for gain of its public roads, it is difficult to see how any
regulation of passing commercial vehicles can be called an
unreasonable deprivation of property merely because of the
interurban character of the business.' From a practical point
of view, to confer upon a city the duty of caring for its streets,
and then to withhold the power to regulate those vehicles which
may be the most puzzling elements of its highway problem, would
seem to place an unwarranted burden on a municipality.
In a similar manner, the fact that commercial traffic makes
the public road its place of business can even be employed to
extend the boundaries of state control over "common" carriers.
In some instances, failure to recognize this fact has led to the
avoidance on constitutional grounds of useful and reasonable
legislation aimed at the regulation of "common" carriers.0 Such
statutes have been declared void as constituting an unequal dis-
crimination between the jitney and the pleasure car, as an in-
terference with the contractual rights of the former,2 1 as having
no basis in matters affecting public welfare,22 and simply as "not
17 City of Argenta v. Keath, 130 Ark. 334, 197 S. W. 686 (1917); Ex
Parte Smith, 33 Cal. App. 161,164 Pac. 618 (1917) ; Commonwealthv Stodder,
2 Cush. 562 (Mlass. 1848); Cary v. North Plainfield, 49 N. J. L. 110, 7 Atl.
42 (1886); Morristown-Mladison Auto Bus Co. v. Madison, 85 N. J. L. 59,
88 At. 829 (1913); White Oak Coal Co. v. Manchester, 109 Va. 749, 64
S. E. 944 (1909).
1$ City of St. Charles v. Nolle, 51 Mo. 122 (1872) ; Plymouth v. Cooper,
135 N. C. 1, 47 S. E. 129 (1904).
19 Cf. 2 DILLoN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) § 718.
2 0 Jitney Bus Ass'n of Wilkesbarre v. Wilkesbarre, 256 Pa. 462, 100 At].
954 (1917) (provision for continuing liability on an indemnity bond re-
quired of jitney operators declared invalid); City of Columbia v. Alexander,
125 S. C. 530, 119 S. E. 241 (1923) (ordinance forbidding cab drivers to
operate on a busy street during certain rush hIours, declared to be an un-
equal discrimination between the jitney and the pleasure car).
21 City of Columbia v. Alexander, supra note 20, at 541, 119 S. E. at 244.
22 Curry v. Osborne, 76 Fla. 39, 42, 79 So. 293, 294 (1918).
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justifiable or reasonable." 23 These constitutional restrictions
on the regulative power of a state could be relegated to the back-
ground if due consideration were given to the fact that, while
power to control a business because it is "affected with the pub-
lic interest" is limited to regulation,24 the power to control it
because it uses the highway for purposes of private gain ex-
tends to absolute prohibition. 25 Consequently under this latter
theory state motor carrier regulation may reasonably be allowed
a much broader scope.
The fact that motor carriers are merely privileged in their
use of the road can hardly be used to broaden the power of a
state over commercial vehicles moving in interstate commerce.
By recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, prac-
tically the whole field of interstate motor traffic has been re-
served to the federal government, to the exclusion of the state.-*
Yet, under the doctrine of Massachusetts v. Mellot,27 it may be
possible for the national government to participate in the regu-
lation of intrastate commercial traffic by .the simple expedient
of attaching conditions to the subsidization of state roads, which
conditions, when embodied in state legislative enactments would
not be subject to constitutional attack if due regard were given
to the merely privileged position of commercial traffic on the
highway.
The recent expansion in motor transportation bringing with
it a necessity for new and more stringent regulation, lends
vital significance to this distinction between ordinary travel and
business users of the highway. Although the courts will prob-
ably not allow the legislatures to ride rough-shod over the motor
carrier,2 a proper recognition of the position of the carrier on
23 Jitney Bus Ass'n of Wilkesbarre v. Wilkesbarre, supra note 20, at 469,
100 AtI. at 955.
24 TiEDiAN, LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER (1886) § 85.
25 See Peters v. San Antonio, 195 S. W. 989, 990 (Tex. Civ.App. 1917).
26 Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 325, 45 Sup. Ct. 327 (1925); Bush v.
Maloy, 267 U. S. 317, 45 Sup. Ct. 326 (1925). Previous to these cases it
had been held that, in the absence of federal legislation on the subject a
state could regulate motor vehicles moving in interstate commerce. Hend-
rick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 35 Sup. Ct. 140 (1915). Reasonable and
necessary regulative measures which only incidentally affect interstate
commerce are permissible. Liberty Highway Co. v. Michigan Public Utili-
ties Commission, 294 Fed. 703 (E. D. Mich. 1923).
27 262 U. S. 447, 43 Sup. Ct. 597 (1923). It was here held that the,
Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over a suit by a state to enjoin the
enforcement of a federal act which was to become operative in the state
only on the state's acceptance of it.
28 It is either expressed or implied in all of the cases which apply the
distinction between ordinary and business users of the highway, supra
note 6, that unfair and arbitrary measures will not be sanctioned. But of.
Peters v. San Antonio, supra note 25, at 990: "The use of the streets for
the prosecution of any private business may be wholly denied, or granted
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the highway may well serve to extend the boundaries of the
state's power over commercial traffic. Not only would such
recognition obviate the necessity of affecting the business of the
motor-carrier with the public interest, but it may enable a court
to declare in favor of the reasonableness of many a desirable
and needed regulative measure which otherwise might be deemed
an unreasonable deprivation of property.23
-with such provisions as may be deemed proper by the municipality. We
fail to understand how the reasonableness of such regulations can be made
the basis of an attack."
29 Thus far, the distinction between ordinary and commercial users of
the highway has only been applied by the courts in cases involving motor-
carrier regulation. It may be noted, however, that the street railway,
just as much as the motor bus, makes the highway its place of business.
Indeed, it has been stated that a trolley is not on the street as of right,
but merely by privilege. Amesbury v. Citizen's Electric Street Railway
Co., 199 Mass. 394, 85 N. E. 419 (1908). The relatively large investment
which the street railway represents, and the fact that it operates on tracks,
give the trolley a permanent quality which distinguishes it from the bus.
Thus a regulative measure -which, when applied to ja motor carrier would
be perfectly legitimate, might amount to a deprivation of property if ap-
p-lied to a street car.
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